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PROPERTY
by
James H. Wallenstein*
in last year's Survey Article on Property,1 this Article will emphasize
hose topics which relate most directly to real property concepts and practice, but will not include topics which constitute major portions of other
Articles in this Survey issue.
A

I.

STATUS OF TITLE

Ownership and Boundary Disputes" As in previous years, of the generally
recognized methods for proving title, 2 proof of title by adverse possession received primary attention in litigation during the survey year. Unlike previous years, however, the question of adverse possession remained essentially
one of fact, with no unique legal issues being propounded. 3 Nevertheless,
at least three noteworthy ownership issues did arise in cases decided during
the year. In State v. Sunray DX Oil Co. 4 the court denied the title claim
of the State of Texas, holding in part that the defendant held superior title
through sufficient proof of record title from the sovereign of the land. The
holding of sufficiency was not altered by the state's claims of invalid original
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance rendered by James Richard O'Neill, a student editor of the Southwestern Law Journal, and
Frank Arthur St. Claire, a student at New York University School of Law.
1. Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 27 (1974)
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1974 Property Article].
2. As noted in a case decided during the survey year, the three generally recognized
.proofs of title are as follows: "[R]ecord title from the sovereignty of the soil, title from
common source, or title by limitation [adverse possession]." Reinhardt v. North, 507
S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Land v. Turner,
377 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1964).
3. United States v. Stanton, 495 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1974) (the federal government
was held to own the entire undivided interest in a tract through a cotenant's transfer
to it of the entire fee interest, followed by the federal government's adverse possession
of the tract); Bridwell v. Long, 508 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no
writ) (summary judgment was precluded by the existence of a material fact as to
whether the plaintiff's fencing of the land had been a "casual and undesigned" enclosure
resulting in incidental grazing or had been effected with the intent to hold the land as
owner by limitation); Toscano v. Delgado, 506 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ) (possession of a tract by the plaintiff's predecessor after such
predecessor had executed a quitclaim deed of his interest did not constitute adverse possession); Spring Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Lilly White Church, 505 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ) (the school district was unable to establish its adverse possession of the property in that it had entered upon the land in recognition of the title of the church, and there was no evidence establishing notice to the
church that this tenancy relationship had been repudiated); Hensz v. Linnstaedt, 501
S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ) (the plaintiff had not entered the land with the intention of claiming it as his own; therefore, his claimed occupancy under the ten-year statute was not adverse, but rather subservient to the paramount title); McDonald v. Batson, 501 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ, App.-Waco 1973, no
writ) (evidence of the plaintiffs' acknowledgment of title in another, even though made
after the limitation title had been completed, was admissible as tending to show that the
possession had not been adverse), affd on appeal after remand, 514 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
4. 503 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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conveyances, 5 the court confirming the doctrine of "juridical possession"but unfortunately not adding any additional commentary as to how that doctrine should be classified among proof-of-title methods. 6 In Lakefront Trust,
Inc v. City of Port Arthur7 the court considered the question, evidently one
of first impression, of whether land eroded by navigable waters (and thereby
lost by the owners to the state) returns in part to the original owners when
an island is later man-made at the same location. In holding that title to
the new island remained in the state, the court in the Lakefront Trust decision first noted that the original owners had presented no evidence of additions to their land through accretion, and further concluded that even if addition to the owners' land through accretion had been shown, it would have
been inward accretion from the island toward the mainland, which would not
have enabled the owners to claim the island. 8 Finally, in an opinion issued
during the survey year, the Texas Attorney General stated that an execution
sale based upon a void judgment does not pass title even to a bona fide purchaser. 9
Although there were no particularly significant decisions rendered during
the survey year dealing with surveys and boundaries, two reported cases may
be worthwhile preparatory reading for parties who employ surveyors for the
purpose of proving original boundaries. In McHard v. State'0 the trial court
had withdrawn the plaintiffs' trespass to try title suit from the jury after it
had returned inconsistent findings, but had then ruled that the plaintiffs had
established their claimed lines of the survey as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, noting the rule from Kirby Lumber Corp.
v. Lindsey" that in establishing the lines of a survey as a matter of law it
is sufficient if they are fixed with reasonable certainty. The court held -that
the testimony of the plaintiffs' surveyor, corroborated by the field notes of
earlier surveyors, constituted sufficient evidence for the plaintiffs to prevail
as a matter of law. On the other hand, in Waldrop v. Manning12 the court
remanded a boundary dispute for a new trial, holding that the surveys pre5. Id. at 823-24. The State of Texas contended that the original grantees were
not citizens of the sovereign of the land, the Republic of Mexico, and that the granting
agency had no legal authority to issue title to such original grantees.

6. The court indicated that, although the doctrine of juridical possession created

only a legal presumption, it was "particularly applicable" where the acts of the authorities
remained unchallenged for an extensive period of time. In view of Tax. Rav. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5517 (1958), which denies the defense of adverse possession in claims by the
State of Texas, the doctrine of "juridical possession" appears to create a presumption
almost as conclusive as adverse possession but falling under the category of "proof of
title traced from the sovereign." For further mention of the concept of juridical possesssion, see Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 27 n.3.
7. 505 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. See Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958), where the supreme
court held, in essence, that land created through the process of accretion was vested in
the owner of the property from which the accretions commenced. See also Lorino v.
Crawford Packing Co., 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.2d 410 (1943).

9. Tax. A'rr'Y

GEN.

Op. No. H-358 (1974), which also concluded that where the

judgment creditor has been paid twice because of the invalid execution sale, a court, as
a matter of equity, should require him to repay the purchase money to the bona fide
purchaser.
10. 509 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

11. 455 S.W.2d 733, 740 (Tex. 1970).
12. 507 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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pared for the plaintiffs should have been excluded from evidence as being
of no probative value because they contained no factual information tying
them to the original survey. In the Waldrop case the plaintiffs' surveyor had
attempted to locate a boundary line of the original survey from a point called
for in the field notes of a junior survey. The court rejected this attempt,
concluding that the surveyor should have exhausted the possibility of locating
the original senior survey boundary line through deed references and natural
or artificial objects on the ground, prior to resorting to the secondary source
of a junior survey.
One decision during the survey year, Stewart v. Mobley,' 3 involved the
characterization of future interests in real property, the court having been
presented with the familiar challenge of distinguishing between (i) the possibility of reverter which accompanies an estate in fee simple determinable (often referred by Texas courts as a "conditional limitation"), and (ii) the
power of termination which accompanies an estate in fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent. 14 In the Stewart case, the plaintiffs in a declaratory
judgment action alleged that the defendant had lost title because of his failure to comply with the provision in a 1902 deed to the defendant's predecessor as grantee, which prescribed that the grantee would hold the property
for "so long as the same shall be used for the purpose aforesaid [a lifesaving
station], and should the United States [the grantee] cease to use the same for
the purposes aforesaid for the space of three years, then and in that event the
said land shall revert to the said parties of the first part [the original grantors],
their successors, heirs and assigns."' 5 The court's opinion, although seeming
to be correct both in its functional approach to the issues and in its selection
of supporting Texas case authority, nevertheless failed to halt a trend of imprecise terminology and characterization which has impeded accurate predictions as to the course of the common law with regard to future interests.', In
arguing its position to the court, the defendant relied upon the 1919 decision
of Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.' 7 as support for his contention that
13. 500 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. See 1 & 2 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 4445, 153-63 (1936); 2 R. POWELL,
187-90, 270-72, 280-82 (1971); Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry,
REAL PROPERTY
and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion and the Tying Up of Land, 31 FORDHAM
L. REv. 303 (1962); Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1953); cf. Williams, Restrictions
on the Use of Land, 27 TExAS L. REV. 158 (1948); Note, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices To Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARv. L. REv. 248
(1940).
15. Stewart v. Mobley, 500 S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. Judicial opinions contain may irreconcilable statements because the terms
'fee simple determinable' and 'fee simple subject to a condition subsequent'
have been used loosely and interchangeably. Important differences of result flow from the difference between the automatic ending of an estate,
which is characteristic of the estate in fee simple determinable, and the
ending only at the option of the grantor or his successor, which is charac-

teristic of the estate in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Clarity and utility of doctrine of stare decisis would both be served by adhereence to the use of only one term for a single type of interest.
2 R. POWELL, supra note 14, T 188, at 54-56 (emphasis in original).
17. 212 S.W. 639 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted). The deed of real
property to a railroad contained a clause that the premises were to be used "exclusively
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the quoted language of the 1902 deed had "created a condition subsequent
which, having been satisfied, is of no further force or effect.' 8 The plaintiffs
on the other hand contended that the language of the 1902 deed had imposed a "conditional limitation"'19 which had caused the land to revert to them
automatically upon failure of compliance with the condition. In addition,
relying upon the 1962 Supreme Court of Texas opinion, Lawyers Trust
Co. v. City of Houston,2 0 the plaintiffs further contended that even if the
deed had not created a conditional limitation, the property had reverted to
them upon reentry, which had been effected by their filing of the instant law
suit. The court acknowledged that both cases cited as precedent by the respective litigants involved fact situations and deed clauses analogous to the
instant case. The court, however, ruled that the Lawyers Trust decision was
controlling, and that regardless of whether the deed created a "conditional
limitation" (which would cause the property automatically to revert to the
plaintiffs) or a "condition subsequent" (with the right of reentry having been
exercised by the plaintiffs' filing of the instant law suit), the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover the property. The court's reliance on the Lawyers Trust
decision was certainly well founded-after all, the Stevens decision predated
the Lawyers Trust decision by more than forty years and the supreme court
had merely adopted the judgment, not the full opinion, of the Stevens decision. However, the court in Stewart did not rebut, or even expressly distinguish, the Stevens case, but merely dismissed it summarily as not being
applicable. The law of future interests in Texas, therefore, still has no
definitive characterization of terms; moreover, it has neither a workable
definition nor a rejection of the "enhancement of value theory" which de21
termined the outcome of the Stevens case.
Nearly all of the status-of-title cases decided during the survey year were
initiated under the trespass to try title form of action, the statutorily prescribed form for resolving ownership and boundary disputes in Texas. 22 For
for railroad depot grounds and railroad business purposes . . . and that if said premises
shall cease wholly to be used for the purposes herein contained they shall revert to the
grantors or their successors." Id. at 640. A second deed provided that the property
was to remain in the railroad "so long as the said land shall be used as a railroad right
of way and if not so used shall revert to the grantors herein." Id. at 641.
18. Stewart v. Mobley, 500 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Id.
20. 359 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1962). The instrument dedicating certain lands for parks
and other purposes provided that "if, on or after the expiration of twenty-five (25) years
from date hereof, any tracts or tracts ... cease to be used for the purpose or purposes
indicated thereon, the fee title to any such tract or tracts shall vest and be in . . . [the
grantor]." Id. at 888.
21. The Stevens court, in dismissing without discussion the right of reentry issue,
apparently relied heavily upon an assumption that the primary consideration received by
the grantors was the enhancement in value of their adjoining property through the conditions imposed on the use of the property granted. Conveyance by the grantors of all
of their remaining property was therefore deemed by the court to terminate their continued interest in enforcement of the conditions. The court in the instant case seemingly
acknowledged this "enhancement in value theory," but held, without discussing the theory (and in the face of the trial court's findings of fact which supported applying the
theory), that the grounds of decision would be the same even assuming the validity of
a finding that enhancement of value was the primary consideration for the original deed.
22. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7364 (1960); TEx. R. Civ. P. 783.
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the most part, these cases merely reiterated previously settled rules in
Texas. 23 However, in a case involving another form of action, Estabrook v.
Wise,2 4 the court considered the question of the power of Texas courts to render judgments affecting title to real property situated in other states. The
former wife had brought suit against her former husband seeking a court decree ordering him to execute a deed to her of her alleged one-half community
interest in certain mineral interests in lands situated in Alabama and Florida,
which properties the husband had failed to inventory at the time of the divorce property settlement. Although acknowledging that it did not have in
rem jurisdiction over the out-of-state property, the court nevertheless held
that the relief requested by the plaintiff could be granted as an exercise of
a Texas court's equitable jurisdiction in personam over the husband. The
action was therefore characterized as one which directly affected and
operated upon the person of the husband, and not upon the subject matter
consisting of out-of-state real property. To be sure, the authorities reviewed
in the instant decision amply support the court's holding that it could obtain
in personam injunction powers over a person owning out-of-state real property. Nevertheless, one dissenting judge questioned the court's determination
that the instant action was essentially one in personam, arguing that since
the title question itself was the essential element of the case, the situs of the
25
property should determine the situs of the litigation.
Finally, in Meadows v. Bierschwale26 the supreme court admitted that its
1966 decision in Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v. Thompson 27 may
have created confusion as to the Texas common law of constructive trust. In
its earlier decision the supreme court had stated that "for a constructive trust
to arise there must be a fiduciary relationship before, and apart from, the
agreement made the basis of the suit."' 28 In the Meadows decision the court
cautioned that "this language must be viewed in the context of the fact situation that gave rise to it" 29 and stated unequivocally that "actual fraud, as well
as breach of a confidential relationship, justifies the imposition of a constructive trust."

0

Easements and Other Rights. In Coleman v. Forister3 1 the supreme court
23. Outlaw v. Noland, 506 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974,
no writ) (confirming that a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff constitutes an
affirmative recitation that title in the contested land is in the adverse party); Corder
v. Foster, 505 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(reviewing certain procedural rules); Sanders v. Taylor, 500 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1973, no writ) (reviewing the effect of disclaimers or omissions in the
answer by an adverse party).
24. 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ granted).
25. Id. at 253 (Dunagan, C.J., dissenting).
26. 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974).
27. 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966).
28. Id. at 336, quoted favorably in Tyra v. Woodson, 495 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1973),
noted in Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 30. For a critique of this principle, see Olds,
Oral Trusts of Land for Grantor-Restitution,6 HOUSTON L. REv. 113, 126 (1968). See
also Comment, Tyra v. Woodson: Breach of a Fiduciary Relationship and the Constructive Trust, 26 BAYLOR. L. REv. 91 (1974).
29. Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. 1974).
30. Id. at 128.
31. 514 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1974).
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admitted that its 1968 per curiam opinion in the same case 32 had been erroneous8 3 and restricted the plaintiffs' waterfront easement to one-foot strips
across the eastern boundary of the property and the walkway along the waterfront. In reliance upon the earlier supreme court pronouncement, the trial
court and court of appeals had determined the plaintiffs' easement to apply
in "blanket" fashion to all of the defendants' property and had ordered the
defendants to remove the residence which they had constructed on their property.3 4 The final reversal by the supreme court does appear to reflect a proper
judicial aversion for "blanket" easements when relevant facts demonstrate a
lesser easement to be sufficient for the enjoyment contemplated; however,
as pointed out by the three-judge dissent, the decision probably does injustice
to the plaintiffs who may have failed to present available evidence after the
1968 per curiam opinion.
Although not a new legal doctrine to Texas property law, the concept of
"an implied easement appurtenant" was recognized and reaffirmed in Eric
Erikson, Inc. v. Crooks.3 5 Both the plaintiffs' property and certain nearby
subdivision property had previously been under the common ownership of the
defendant-vendor's predecessor in title, and such predecessor had installed
a drainage sewer pipe for the subdivision property which, at the time of the
plaintiff's purchase, emptied onto the plaintiffs' land. In its decision the
court acknowledged the following facts: the plaintiffs had not been aware
of the existence of the drainage pipe on their property at the time of the
purchase; the general warranty deed to the plaintiffs had contained no exception for the easement; record title to the property had revealed no recorded
drainage easement; and the drainage pipe had not been in place long enough
to establish an easement by prescription.
Nevertheless, because the
common ownership of all of the property had been in the defendant's predecessor in title, who had established what was subsequently to become the
plaintiffs' property as the subservient estate for the benefit of the subdivision
property, the court declared that the plaintiffs' property was in fact subject
to an "implied drainage easement appurtenant." In rendering its decision,
the court relied primarily upon the following statement from the 1959 supreme court opinion in Ulbricht v. Friedsam: "Where an owner of an entire
tract of land . . . employs a part thereof so that one derives from the other
a benefit or advantage of a continuous, permanent, and apparent nature, and
sells the one in favor of which such quasi easement exists, such easement,
being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, will
'3 6
pass to the grantee by implication.
32. Coleman v. Forister, 431 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1968), aff'g Forister v. Coleman, 418

S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967).
33. "[lit is our judgment that the per curiam opinion and its judgment were wrong,

and it is overruled." 514 S.W.2d at 903.

34. Coleman v. Forister, 497 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), mentioned in Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 31 nn. 36, 37.
35. 508 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).

36. 159 Tex. 607, 619, 325 S.W.2d 669, 676 (1959). For a further discussion of the
concept of the implied easement appurtenant, see Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364
S.W.2d 196, 207-08 (Tex. 1962), and Westbrook v. Wright, 477 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ). It is unfortunate that the property
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One further case dealing in part with the law of easements, Intratex Gas

Co. v. Burkholder,3 7 reiterated the well settled rule that when one has obtained a right-of-way across the land of another through execution of an easement (in this case granting the right to construct and maintain a gas pipeline)
the subservient landowner has no cause of action for damages resulting from
the exercise of the rights under the easement, except upon a showing of negligent exercise of those rights.
Title Insurance. The 1974 Property Article pointed out that the 63rd Legislature of the State of Texas had considered proposed legislation which would
have authorized attorneys in the state to insure title to real property.38 That
proposed legislation was not passed; however, partially in response to the
challenge of this potential competition from lawyers, the Texas Land Title
Association did agree to meet with representatives from the State Bar of

Texas to discuss and possibly settle their differences. This author has reviewed various agenda and proposals discussed during these joint meetings,
and considers them to be quite meritorious. 39 Unfortunately,' the Texas Land
Title Association and the State Bar of Texas seem to have relegated these

proposals to a low priority for the 64th Legislature and have instead concentrated on a renewed effort to establish bar-related title insurance. 40

II. PURCHASES AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
Contracts of Sale. Disputes concerning the sufficiency of precision in real
property contracts were, as in prior years, the subject of a moderate amount
interest created by the common owner of the entire tract prior to sale is referred to as
a "quasi easement," a term lacking adequate legal definition.
37. 506 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ), which arose upon
the easement holders' pleas of privilege to be sued in their home county; the appellate
court sustaining such pleas in finding that no exception to the general venue rule was
applicable to the facts of the case.
38. H.B. 1104, 63d Leg. (1973), which was reported favorably out of the house
committee on the judiciary but was never acted upon by the house. See Wallenstein,
supra note 1, at 34-35.
39. For example, at a meeting held October 5, 1974, of a special "Liaison Committee" between the Texas Land Title Association and the State Bar of Texas, Mr. Stanley
D. Rosenberg, representing the State Bar members, advanced the following proposals (as
evidenced by the official minutes of that meeting prepared by William W. Gibson, Jr.,
Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law, acting as co-chairman of the
meeting): (I) that the State Board of Insurance receive adequate funding for effective
regulation; (2) that the measure of insured loss be determined with regard to the actual
monetary loss of the insured; (3) that premiums be reduced in certain instances of mere
re-issuance; (4) that insurance companies be required to issue both an owner's and a
mortgagee's policy at applicable closings; (5) that no special exception be permitted for
area or quantity of land when a survey has been furnished; (6) that the exception for
"rights of parties in possession" be subject to more restrictive rules; (7) that the practice
of charging unregulated fees be reviewed; (8) that specific procedural rules be consid-

ered for bonding against liens; (9) that a standard form for an owner's policy commitment be promulgated; (10) that continuing education in the area of title insurance be
encouraged; (11) that time limits for payment of losses be considered; (12) that rulings
and opinions of the State Board of Insurance be made public; (13) that practices of including unwarranted exceptions (such as "visible and apparent easements") be investigated; (14) that copies of all applicable documents be furnished by the insurer; and (15)
that formal escrow procedures be established.
40. House Bill No. 1856 and Senate Bill No. 880 each reflect the legislature's concentration on bar-related title insurance. As this Article goes to the printer, the likelihood of passage of either bill is undetermined.
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of litigation. All of the cases, including the only noteworthy decision,
Johnson v. Snell4 ' (discussed in the 1974 Property Article because of the relationship between the lower court's decision and the supreme court's reversal
of that decision 42), resulted from challenges as to the draftsmanship of the
respective contracts, with two courts reviewing the sufficiency of land descriptions 43 and one reviewing the required certainty as to the date of closing and
44
time of payment.
-In addition to issues relating to the sufficiency of contracts of sale, the enforceability of such contracts after execution also received considerable judicial attention during the survey year. With the majority of fact situations
occurring during a period of generally rising real estate values, one might
speculate that this enforcement oriented litigation-primarily instituted by
purchasers-resulted from attempts on the part of sellers to escape executory
or partially executed contracts after receipt of better offers. This would appear to have been the situation in Sterling v. Apple, 45 where the defendantsellers granted an option on their property to the defendant-purchasers, although having previously contracted to sell the same property to the plaintiff
for one-half of the purchase price stated in the option. In ordering specific
performance of the plaintiff's contract, the court acknowledged that the jury
had found that the plaintiff's conduct "led . . . [defendant-sellers] reason-

ably to believe that he did not intend to complete the purchase of the land
contracted for in the earnest money contract."' 46 Nevertheless because the
court found "no showing that . . . [the plaintiff] failed to take any action

required of him"' 47 prior to the scheduled closing, the court affirmed the trial
court's specific enforcement of the original contract. This case should be
read carefully by parties to a contract who wish to avoid their obligations
under the rationales of anticipatory breach and estoppel. 4 'In another case
41. 504 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1973), in which case the supreme court held that the con-

tract to sell real property was not so vague and incomplete as to provisions which were
necessary to the sale that specific performance was precluded.
42. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 35-36.
43. National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 512 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1974, writ granted) (evidence permitted a finding that the parties to the contracts
intended to describe particular and identified tracts of land, ratification being a component element of the purchasers' case against the vendor); Riebe v. Foale, 508 S.W.2d 175
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (land descriptions in the listing agreement and the sales contract were sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds). See also
Note, Contracts-Texas Allows Reformation of Land Contracts To Correct Statute of
Frauds Deficiencies if Identity is Clear in the Minds of the Parties, 5 Thx. TEci L.
REv. 839 (1974), discussing Shotwell v. Morrow, 498 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Paxton v. Spencer, 503 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no
writ), wherein it was held that the uncertainty as to the date of closing and time of
payment under the contract was such that specific performance of the contract for the
sale of real property was precluded.
45. 513 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
46. Sterling v. Apple, 513 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
47. Id. at 258.
48. But see Dickey v. Johnson, 513 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974,
no writ), for a more lenient interpretation of seller's obligations when the purchaser
tikes actions inconsistent with the contract,
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following a similar pattern 49 the court ordered specific performance of the
contract for the sale of real estate in favor of the purchaser, holding that although the placing of a check payable to the sellers in an envelope left with
the appropriate bank, rather than depositing cash with the bank as required
by the terms of the contract of sale, was a breach of the contract, it was not
a material breach justifying the sellers' refusal to convey the property. Still
other purchasers sought an order requiring their sellers to execute a general
warranty deed in the face of a claimed forfeiture for default in payments,
the court holding that the rendering of summary judgment by the trial court
was precluded by the existence of a disputed fact as to whether the sellers
had entered into an agreement with the purchasers subsequent to the claimed
forfeiture extending the time for payment of the balance due and thereby
waiving the asserted forfeiture. 50 In remanding the case for trial, the court
reiterated the general disfavor with which forfeitures are viewed in connection with contracts for the sale of real property. 51 In another suit involving
the issues of rescission and waiver 5 2 the court rejected the sellers' attempt
to rescind the contract for the sale of their ranch on the basis of an alleged
misrepresentation by the purchaser as to the zoning status of an exchange
tract of land. The court reasoned that the sellers' acceptance of certain benefits under the contract had effectively waived the alleged misrepresentation.
Two decisions during the survey year involved suits by purchasers seeking
specific performance of land contracts against the heirs of the original seller.
In Roeber v. DuBose53 the seller had died after entering into the sales contract with the purchasers, but prior to executing a general warranty deed.
The court ordered specific performance of the contract, with the exception
that the seller's daughter, his sole heir, was permitted to execute a deed without warranty instead of the general warranty deed specified in the contract. The court cited no authority in support of its conclusion to dispense with a general warranty deed in this situation, and instead merely
determined that it would be inequitable to require the heir to execute a
general warranty deed since she should not be made to assume the risk of
warranting title under a contract to which she was not a party. Although
this author has found no cases directly in point, it would appear that the
court's alteration of the contract terms is incorrect. In enforcing the contract,
the court obviously required the purchaser to pay to the heir the full purchase
price specified in the contract; however, after receiving a deed without warranty, the purchaser (or the purchaser's title insurer, if title was insured) ap49. Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
50. Beck v. Monsell, 502 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
51. "The remedy by rescission is not favored, and . . . slight circumstances, when
they may be properly treated as indicative of a purpose upon the part of the vendor not
to insist on that remedy, may be treated as a waiver of the right to rescind, unless its

maintenance becomes necessary to enable the vendor to enforce the payment of the con-

Id. at 883, the court quoting
sideration for which he contracted to sell the land .......
from Moore v. Giesecke, 76 Tex. 543, 551, 13 S.W. 290, 293 (1890).
52. De Puy v. Bodine, 509 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).

53. 510 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
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parently would have no claim against the heir for refund of the purchase
price if title proved defective. Inasmuch as warranties of title are generally
limited in amount by the amount of the purchase price, 4 the heir would not
have incurred any unfair risk of loss if the court had enforced the contract
as written. Another case decided during the survey year, dealing with the
obligation of the heirs of a seller to convey title, offers indirect support for
the above conclusion that the Roeber contract embellishment was incorrect.
In this case55 the court ordered specific performance of an option to purchase
contained in a lease made with the deceased lessor. The court required the
lessor's heirs to convey title to the land to the lessee-purchaser, affirming,
without analysis as to deed form (which evidently had not been questioned
by the parties), the trial court's order requiring conveyance by general warranty deed.
Though already discussed adequately in prior law review commentaries,5"
the decision of Allen v. Monk 57 decided by the Supreme Court of Texas during the survey year, should be noted. In that case, the supreme court held
that a purchaser could obtain specific performance of a written contract for
the sale of a homestead executed only by the husband. The result is dictated
by the recent repeal5" of statutes granting to the wife the privilege of retracting her consent to the conveyance prior to confirmation by her separate acknowledgment.5 9
The means by which damages may be fixed upon a purchaser's breach of
a contract to sell realty were at issue in two cases decided during the survey
year. In Ashton v. Bennett60 the court upheld as valid a provision for treating an earnest money deposit as liquidated damages for the purchaser's
anticipatory breach of a contract to sell oil and gas leases. Validation of the
liquidated damages provision, however, was approved by the court only after
a review of the instant fact situation and the supreme court's 1952 decision
in Stewart v. Basey,6 1 where that court had adopted the following Restatement of Contract rule: "(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect
damages recoverable for the breach, unless (a) the amount so fixed is a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the
breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable
54. See Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, opinion
adopted); Comment, Damages for Breach of Warranty in a Deed, 19 BAYLOR L. REV.
289 (1967). See also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 269 (1956) which states that "no one
of such distributees shall be liable beyond his just proportion of the estate he shall have

received in distribution."

55. Morgan v. Stover, 511 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
56. Note, Executory Contracts to Convey the Homestead: A New Remedy, 28 Sw.
L.J. 787 (1974); 11 HOUSTON L. REv. 1028 (1974).
57. 505 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974).
58. Articles 1300, 6605, and 6608 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes were repealed
by the Texas Legislature as of January 1, 1968. Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 735.
59. See also Rich v. McMullan, 506 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which was decided during the survey year and which followed
the supreme court's decision in Allen v. Monk.
60. 503 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952).
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or very difficult of accurate estimation. ' 62 The case of Redding v. Ferguson 63 was significant for its holding that the contract price is not admissible
to prove the value of the described land when the purchasers had never
actually paid that price and, in fact, had never consummated the transaction.
The court of civil appeals rejected two previous condemnation cases, Robards
v. State6 4 and State v. Clevenger,6 as authority that unconsummated contracts are admissible as proof of value, distinguishing both from the instant
case in that the contracts there held admissible were not between the same
parties to the litigation and were not the same contracts out of which the litigation arose. To be sure, a distinction can be drawn between the Robards
and Clevenger decisions and the instant case; nevertheless, it may be
questioned whether the distinction is material inasmuch as the courts in the
former cases emphasized repeatedly that the controlling question in determining admissibility was whether the proffered evidence constituted merely an
unaccepted offer or whether it was a valid and binding contract merely lacking, for one reason or another, final consummation. In the instant case,
because the trial court specifically found that the contract of sale was valid
and binding, 66 the contract of sale was not merely an unaccepted offer and
accordingly should have been admitted as evidence of market value. As
pointed out in the Robards decision, failure to consummate a contract or the
fact that it has been rescinded, as well as all other attendant circumstances,
should not completely preclude the admissibility of the contract price as evidence of market value, but rather should go to the weight which should be
67
given the contract price as evidence of value.
Prospective purchasers were alerted by two courts during the year of
potential risks that may arise from a lackadaisical follow-up of agreements
to purchase real property. In Vallejo v. Romero6 s the failure of the sellers
to confirm in writing their oral lease-purchase option of a house caused the
court to deny the enforceability of the option, with the court also finding insuficient evidence of improvements made by the tenants in reliance upon
the oral option to remove the contract from the statute of frauds. In Willeford v. Walker69 the court reminded purchasers that financing "outs" in
purchase contracts are not as absolute as many laymen believe. The admoni62. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 339 (1932). But see Lane v. Holloway, 509
S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which perhaps implies
that in a real estate joint venture a provision for forfeiture may be enforced if clearly
set out in the agreement-and without regard to the Restatement rule.
63. 501 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This was
a suit by the seller for damages for the breach by purchasers of a contract for the sale
of 2,000 acres of land.
64. 285 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. 384 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Redding v. Ferguson, 501 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Robards v. State, 285 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
68. 511 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
69. 499 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ). This case
involved an action by the vendors against the purchaser of their house to recover an
earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, the vendors alleging the purchaser's breach
of the contract through inadequate attempts to obtain financing.
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tion was bolstered by the citation of Nelson v. Jenkins70 and Huckleberry
v. Wilson, 71 which stand for the proposition that by entering into a contract
of sale where final consummation is contingent upon the purchaser's obtaining
specified financing, the purchaser impliedly promises to pursue a loan application with reasonable diligence. The court in the Willeford case, however,
did ultimately rescue the instant purchaser by finding that he had not been
dilatory in pursuing his loan application.
Conveyances. Only one case decided during the survey year dealt with the
72
validity or extent of warranties in property conveyances, and that decision
7
3
merely followed the supreme court's 1968 ruling in Humber v. Morton that
one who builds and sells new houses impliedly warrants that they have been
constructed in a workmanlike manner and are suitable for human habitation.
The question of warranties on new residential property has also received attention by the National Association of Home Builders which, in an effort to
stem consumer dissatisfaction with the homebuilding industry, has instituted
a Home Owners Warranty program which allows participating homebuilders
74
to provide a relatively full package of express warranties to customers.
Finally, although not effective until June 20, 1975, the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act of 1974, 75 passed by the 93rd Congress at the conclusion
of the survey year, will substantially alter closing procedures for one-to-four
family residences which are purchased through "federally-related mortgage
loans" (a term which is defined quite broadly in the Act). As of the date
this Article goes to the printer, the 'Department of Housing and Urban
76
Development has issued proposed rules for implementation of the Act,
which include forms as well as procedural instructions. Essentially, the Act
and proposed rules require advance notice to the consumer (twelve days in
addition, certain restrictions are
the proposed rules) of all closing costs. ,In
placed on title companies, real estate brokers, lending institutions, and sellers
to assure that the purchasing consumer has the opportunity to negotiate such
closing costs.
Regulation of Brokers Drafting Contracts. The "Statement of Principles by
The State Bar of Texas and the Texas Real Estate Commission" 7 7 was
accepted in final form by both participants on July 18, 1974. However,
although meetings have been held by the Broker-Lawyer Joint Committee
in an effort to activate the Statement of Principles with the promulgation of
70. 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1948, writ ref'd).
71. 284 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1955, writ dism'd).
72. Hollen v. Leadership Homes, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1973, no writ).

73. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), 25 A.L.R.3d 372 (1969), noted in 23 Sw. LJ.
See also McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Con40-41, 750 (1969).
struction Revisited, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 136 (1974).
74. See "How the Home Owners Warranty Program Benefits Builders and Buyers,"
Real Estate Investment Ideas (Institute for Business Planning, Sept. 1974).
75. Pub. L. No. 93-533 (Dec. 22, 1974).

76. 40 Fed. Reg. 7072 (Feb. 18, 1975).
77. See Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 37-38, for a discussion of the evolution of these
principles.
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standard form
real estate contracts, 78 no such promulgation is likely in the
79
near future.
Interstate Land Sales. Although too complex for brief analysis in this
Article, the reader should be cognizant of the 1974 guidelines" and addi82
tional regulations8 ' to the Interstate Land Full Disclosure Act.
Brokerage. As was true of the brokerage cases discussed in the 1974
Property Article, questions of statutory construction again were prominent in
determining the rights of real estate brokers and salesmen. In one such case,
Avent v. Stinnett,s3 the court was called upon to construe the license exemption provisions of the Real Estate License Act.8 4 The plaintiff brought suit
to recover the balance of a commission claimed to be owed to him for his
services in procuring a purchaser for the defendants' ranch, it being
undisputed that the plaintiff was not licensed under the Act. The plaintiff
claimed exemption from the Act under section 6(1), which provides: "The
provisions of this Act shall not apply to the advertising, negotiation or consummation of any purchase, sale, rental or exchange of . . .real estate by

any person, firm, or corporation when such person, firm, or corporation does
not engage in the activities of a Real Estate Broker as an occupation, business
or profession on a full or part-time basis."8 5 The court found the exemption
inapplicable to the plaintiff. Another decision requiring statutory construction8 6 involved an action by the purchasers of a house against the brokerseller (being one and the same person) for damages on the basis of a false
representation made to the purchasers by another real estate agent with
whom the property had been listed. The court held that although at common
law a real estate agent's status as a special agent precluded him from binding
his principal by his false representations as to the property,8 7 section 27.01
(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code s8 now provides that a person
who makes a false representation and a person who benefits from it are
jointly and severally liable.
78. The first meeting of the joint committee was held November 20, 1974, in Aus-

tin, Texas. The secretary of the meeting was William W. Gibson, Jr., Professor of Law,

The University of Texas School of Law.
79. Nevertheless, broker-lawyer "teams" were designated to draft special forms for
the following types of residential real estate contracts: assumption contracts; VA/FHA
contracts; existing homes (new loan or cash consideration); and new home/townhouse.
80. 39 Fed. Reg. 7824 (Feb. 28, 1974), entitled "Condominium and Other Contracts."
81. 39 Fed. Reg. 9431 (March 11, 1974), entitled "Land Registration: Exemptions
and State Filings" and 39 Fed. Reg. 11181 (March 26, 1974), amended the effective
date of the preceding regulations.
82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (Supp. 1975).
83. 513 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
84. TEX. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (1967). Note: Effective May 19, 1975,
this Act has been totally rewritten by Senate Bill No. 344, signed into law on that date.
85. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 6(1) (1967).
86. Ingalls v. Rice, 511 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no
writ).
87. See Loma Vista Dev. Co. v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 686, 690, 180 S.W.2d 922, 924
(1944). But see Citizens Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Muncy, 518 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1974), which points out that an agent's misrepresentations may justify
an action for recision and restitution.
88. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (1968).
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Another interesting case involving brokers' commissions was Anderson v.
Griffith,8 9 in which the sellers sued the broker for recovery of a commission
paid to the broker, as well as for profits realized by the broker in a subsequent resale of the land. In this case the sellers had entered into an agreement whereby, according to the facts accepted as correct by the court, the
defendant became their real estate agent and the purchaser of their land in
his capacity as a "Trustee" for an undisclosed principal. However, prior to
the time of such agreement, the defendant had negotiated with various parties
to arrange for a personal profit to himself after obtaining the property from
the sellers. The court held that the defendant had forfeited his right to the
contractual commission by breaking his fiduciary obligation as agent to the
sellers, that is by failing to disclose his extraneous negotiations for his own
account. Moreover, relying upon the 1942 supreme court decision in
Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp.,90 the court further required the
defendant to pay to the sellers his profit in the reconveyance. Although
probably correct in light of its accepted facts, the Anderson decision should
serve as a warning to real estate brokers who attempt to "tie-up" a property
by executing a contract themselves as both broker and purchaser. A provision should be included in the contract which negates the possibility of a
fiduciary relationship with the seller.
In Jackson v. Williams,9 1 one of three cases where brokers sought their
commissions from their principals on common law principles of contract, the
broker had secured a purchaser for the property, contingent on the purchaser's securing an appraisal of the property equal to the purchase price.
Although the seller had instructed her broker not to return the purchaser's
earnest money without first obtaining a written appraisal valuing the
property at less than the purchase price, the broker had returned the earnest
money after receiving incorrect oral information that the appraisal was inadequate. The seller did eventually close the sale after litigating the enforceability of the contract. The court, with one judge dissenting, held that the
broker was not entitled to a commission on the conveyance. The majority
opinion in the case held that an agent is not entitled to compensation for services after a violation, although innocent, of his principal's instructions. By
way of dictum, the opinion further held that this rule would apply even if
the agent's disobedience resulted in no substantial harm to his principal's
interest.0 2 A concurring opinion would have declared the applicable legal
principle to be that by returning the earnest money the broker had ceased
her efforts to procure a purchaser, and therefore would not be entitled to
a commission when the sale was independently made by the seller, even if
to the same purchaser. 93 The converse of Jackson v. Williams was presented
89. 501 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. 138 Tex. 565, 160 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
91. 510 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. The court quoted with approval from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
385, 469 (1958).

AGENCY
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93. 510 S.W.2d at 647 (Keith, J., concurring). The case of Air Conditioning, Inc.
v. Harrison-Wilson-Pearson, 151 Tex, 635, 639-40, 253 S.W.2d 422, 425 (1952),

formed the basis for this proposition.
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in Knight v. Hicks,94 where the court found the broker entitled to his commission despite his failure to comply with a statutory provision requiring
brokers to advise the purchaser in writing of the need to have the abstract
examined or to obtain title insurance. 95 After acknowledging that the question was one of first impression as to the construction of this statute, the court
rendered an equivocal holding, that the broker's failure to advise the purchaser in accordance with article 6573a is to be excused "if [as the unique
facts of this case showed] he is precluded from doing so by the act of the
seller in dealing directly with the buyer." 96
In a final decision during the survey year 97 involving an action for a brokerage commission, the potentially noteworthy feature of the court's opinion
was its holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's fees upon
the successful conclusion of her case. The court's statement, that "it is well
settled that a suit where recovery is sought for personal services on labor
rendered will entitle one under Article 2226 to attorney's fee[s] even if the
suit is for breach of a special contract," 98 appears to be a somewhat broader
statement of the law than that found in other cases. 99
The 1974 Property Article analyzed several recent developments in securities regulation affecting the form of brokerage often referred to as "syndication."' 100 There was no important litigation in Texas in this area during the
survey year; 10 1 however, several important administrative developments did
occur. On May 24, 1974, the State Securities Board of Texas adopted a
"final" version of its Guidelines for the Registration of Real Estate Programs
(two letter requests have been issued subsequent to such adoption suggesting
possible future amendments). The federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also made several changes in the rules and guidelines
94. 505 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e).
95. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 28 (1967).
96. Knight v. Hicks, 505 S.W.2d 638, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
97. Flagg Realtors, Inc. v. Harvel, 509 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. Id. at 893.

99. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1974). See also notes 150-55 infra
and accompanying text.
100. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 40-42.
101. Nevertheless, significant developments did occur in federal courts. See, e.g., Oxford Fin. Cos., Inc. v. Harvey, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,942 (E.D. Pa. 1974), hold-

ing that the specific joint venture interest in question was not a "security"; Johnson
v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,022 (D.C. Super. 1973), holding that certain land contracts were "securities"; Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500
F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Housing Foundation Inc. v.
Forman, 95 S. Ct. 801, 42 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1975) (No. 75-157), noted in 53 TEXAs L.
REV. 623 (1975), and 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y.

1973), a! 'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974), holding that certain cooperative housing arrangements were "securities"; McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974), district court decision noted in 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 200 (1973), and Bellah
v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974), holding that certain notes secured
by real property were not "securities." See also Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law
and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAW. 411 (1975); Cutler, Weiss & Hocker, Securities and Real Estate: Where the Twain Meet, 2 SEC. REG.
L.J. 48 (1974); Frome, Cooperatives and Condominiums as Securities, 4 REAL ESTATE
REv. 35 (1975); Student Symposium, Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security:
Some Pragmatic Considerations,6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 95 (1974).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

interpreting the federal securities acts, which changes will have a substantial
effect on real estate transactions. For example, the SEC adopted rule 146,102
regulating exemptions from SEC registration under the category of the "private offering,"' 10 3 and rule 147,104 regulating exemptions from SEC registration under the category of the "intrastate offering."' 1 5 In addition the SEC
issued the proposed Guide 60106 which was formulated to regulate the content and form of registration statements relating to interests in real estate

limited partnerships-and by implication providing a guide for "private offering" memorandums which must include the same information as an investor
would have received in a registration statement. These extremely important
administrative rulings, too complex for brief analysis in this Article, have
10
been reviewed quite adequately in other commentaries.

7

III. DEVELOPMENT: FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTION
Public Law 93-501. Responding to record levels of interest rates for loans
during the survey year, the 93rd Congress passed Public Law 93-501,108
amending until July 1, 1977, various sections of the United States Code' 0 9
to permit the contractual interest rate in certain "business or agricultural loans
in the amount of $25,000 or more" to be as high as "5 per centum in excess
of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal
Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve district where the . . . [bank, institu-

tion, small business investment company] is located."

The new law, effec-

tive October 29, 1974, also expressly supersedes any state law to the con-

trary110 unless such state law is passed subsequent to October 29, 1974.111

102. SEC Securities Act Release 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974).
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (1971).
104. SEC Securities Act Release 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974).
105. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(11) (1971).
106. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5465 (March 1, 1974).
107. Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate
Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
622 (1974); Erwin, Marketing Investment Condominiums and Real Estate Syndications
Without Securities Registration: SEC Rule 146, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 119 (1974); Fraidin,
Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 30 Bus. LAW. 313, 323-36 (1975); Green
& Wittner, Private Placements of Securities Under Rule 146, 21 PRAc. LAw. 9 (1975);
Kant, SEC Rule 147-A Further Narrowing of the Intrastate Offering Exemption, 30
Bus. LAw. 73 (1974); Kinderman, The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination
of Its Availability Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAw. 921 (1975); Sowards,
Rule 146: Availability of the Private Offering Exemption, in BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
(June 1974 Special Supp. to Vol. 11); Tilley, The Intrastate Offering Exemption, 37
TEx. B.J. 549 (1974).
108. Pub. L. No. 93-501 (Oct. 29, 1974).
109. The bill amended in similar fashion the following code sections: 12 U.S.C. §
85 (1970) (§ 5197 of the Revised Statutes); 12 U.S.C.'§§ 1811-31 (1970) (The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730(d) (1970) (The National Housing
Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 661 (1970) (The Small Business Investment Act of 1958).
110. Pub. L. No. 93-501, §§ 202, 304 (Oct. 29, 1974). See also Moss v. First Nat'l
Bank, 251 Ky. 390, 65 S.W.2d 88 (1933); Morris, The Laws of Usury as Applied to
National Banks, 81 BANKING L.J. 847 (1964). Contra, John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal
Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942).
111. "The amendments made by this title shall apply to any deposit made or obligation issued in any State after the date of enactment of this title, but prior to the earlier
of (1) July 1, 1977 or (2) the date (after such date of enactment) on which the State
enacts a provision of law which limits the amount of interest which may be charged
in connection with deposits or obligations referred to in the amendments made by this

title," Pub. L. No. 93-501, § 304 (Oct. 29, 1974).
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Certainly welcome in the commercial marketplace (but, unfortunately, tend-

ing to discriminate against insurance companies, real estate investment trusts,
and other lending institutions which are not covered by the law), the new
law nevertheless contains several ambiguities which will likely keep the com112
mentators guessing educatedly for the duration of its existence.
Usury Cases. The cases of W. E. Grace Manufacturing Co. v. Levin 1 3 and
Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp.," 4 discussed in the

1974 Property Article, 115 may well be labelled the "lull before the storm"
as to that area of Texas usury law which relates to the "spreading" of frontend charges." 6 These cases created the impression that courts would give
due recognition to "savings clauses" in loan documents and would refuse to
charge lenders with the entirety of their front-end charges in the initial period
of the loan term. 117 The cases of Southwestern Investment Co. v. Hockley
County Seed & Delinting, Inc." s and Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors'" decided during the survey year, constituted a "storm" of
such intensity that the "lull after the storm" may well have been characterized
by the absence of commercial loan transactions in this state.' 2 0 In the
Hockley decision the lower court, although deciding the case correctly on its
facts, incorrectly infused into its opinion (1) an implied denial of "spreading"
over even a one-year period, and (2) a failure to distinguish between the
effects of fluctuating interest rates during the loan term and the effects of
front-end charges at the beginning of the loan term. The supreme court,
responding to a large number of amicus curiae briefs submitted to it requesting clarification of both issues, refused error with a per curiam "n.r.e." opin112. Among the more frequent questions currently being raised are the following:
What loans are excluded from the term "business or agricultural loans"? Are refinancings covered by the new law? Are refinancings of less than $25,000 (with the original
loan having been more than $25,000) covered? Are construction loans or similar loans
(where $25,000 may be advanced but is not advanced at the commencement of the loan)
covered? Does the maximum rate vary with the discount rate or remain constant as
of the date of the loan (or perhaps the date of the loan commitment)?
113. 506 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1974).
114. 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972).
115. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 42-43, 46-47.
116. For an excellent analysis of this area of the law, see Note, Usury in Texas:
Spreading Interest over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 HousToN L. REv. 159 (1974).
See also Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 45-46 n.126, for commentary to the effect that
the term "spreading" is inaccurate.
117. To be sure, at least two commentators have concluded that Texas law does require that lenders be so charged. Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TExAs L. REV. 419, 426 (1971); Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current
Convenience-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 246 (1968). This
author has reviewed the authority cited by those commentators and finds such authority
inadequate to support their prior conclusions. And see Note, supra note 116, for a comprehensive rebuttal.
118. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e., 516 S.W.2d 136
(Tex.1974).
119. 515 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ), on remand, Summary Judgment by 111 th District Court, Webb County, Texas (Oct. 29, 1974).
120. House Bill No. 351, passed by the 64th Legislature on March 12, 1974, and
signed into law by Governor Briscoe, renders these two decisions relatively harmless
with regard to future loan transactions. The "spreading" provisions of House Bill No.
351, which will be discussed in depth in next year's Survey, are essentially the same as
Senate Bill No. 209 of the 63d Legislature, discussed in the 1974 Property Article. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 42-45.
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ion carefully worded in order to render the lower court's opinion ineffectual
as to both components of its breathtaking dictum. Unfortunately, in the
Riverdrive Mall decision, rendered before the supreme court's per curiam
opinion in the Hockley case, the court of appeals relied heavily on the
Hockley dictum in making similar gratuitous commentaries on the Texas
usury laws, and upon remand the trial court rendered judgment on the basis
of such commentaries. The progress of this case will be watched carefully
by all lenders having current loans in this state. 121 A few other cases decided
during the survey year in the area of usury regulation deserve footnote mention, 122 as do two excellent student commentaries published during the survey
23
year.'
Mortgages. As has been true in previous years, mortgage litigation during
the survey year involved the usual volume of challenges to foreclosure. The
fact that it is fairly easy to stall a foreclosure sale was again made evident
by at least one decision during the year,' 24 where the court refused to find
that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction against a foreclosure (in this case, on the basis of an allegation that no
default in payment existed on the indebtedness). The principle of waiver
operated in another case 125 to bar the seller's assertion of forfeiture under
a contract for the sale of realty. The seller's consistent past conduct of accepting late payments of monthly installments under the contract, in light of
the attendant circumstances, made the court's decision an easy one in holding
that the right of forfeiture had been waived, particularly so when there were
no delinquent installments at the time the seller finally undertook to effect
the forfeiture. In Jeffrey v. Bond 126 the supreme court was confronted with
a foreclosure situation, the outcome of which depended to some extent on
the applicability of the doctrine of merger. The court held that when one
of two cotenants of real property pays a mortgage debt and receives an assignment of the note and mortgage, such mortgage is not lost by merger of
121. In light of Mr. Justice Douglas' recommendations, Douglas, Law Reviews and
Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1965), the author wishes to point out, with respect to his conclusions accompanying this and the immedately preceding footnotes, that
his law practice includes representation of both real estate lenders and real estate developers.
122. Home Savings Ass'n v. Crow, 514 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
writ granted) (challenges of a "complicated subterfuge" in a multi-cornered loan transaction); Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, no writ) (paying off another's debt in consideration for extending debtor's
own debt constitutes interest); Davis Bros. v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ) (not dealing directly with usury but analyzing the
differences between leases and security agreements; Compare Moran v. Kenai Towing
Salvage, Inc., 523 P.2d 1237 (Alas. 1974), and American Realty Trust v. United States,
498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974)); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1974, no writ) (renewal notes tainted with usury of original note; perhaps a special concern in view of the legislation noted at notes 108-12, 120 supra).
123. Comment, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest Over the Entire Period of the
Loan, 12 HoUSTON L. REV. 159 (1974); Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporate Borrower Creates Usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974).

124. Miller v. A-OK Motel, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ).
125. Jordan v. Crockett, 511 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
126. 509 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1974).
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the cotenant's legal and equitable interests. On the basis of prior authority,' 27 the court found that the cotenant who paid the mortgage in full was
entitled to foreclosure and sale of the land, as well as to priority in the col12
lection of his debts as against an intervening lienholder. 8
Numerous decisions during the survey year involved the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings themselves. In two federal court decisions, 1 29 both
discussed in the 1974 Property Article, 130 the courts held that non-judicial
foreclosures do not constitute "state action" sufficient to support federal jurisdiction since they are consummated pursuant to a private contractual arrangement. 18 ' In Hutson v. Sadler'1 2 the court upheld the validity of a non-judicial foreclosure sale against a claim that the notices had not been posted
for the statutory twenty-one days prior to the sale. In a well-reasoned and
well-documented opinion, the court held that in computing the length of time
for which notice must be posted,' 33 the day of posting may be included when
the day of sale is excluded. The Hutson case is apparently the first state
decision to rule precisely on this issue,13 4 and although the difference of one
day may seem insignificant, in light of current market conditions, it may very
well serve to provide the additional time needed for "eleventh-hour" negotiation.
The principle that a foreclosure sale will not be voided merely because the

property was sold for a price well below its fair market value was reiterated
in three cases decided during the survey year. 135 The court in one of the
cases emphasized the rule that in order to support a request to set aside a
foreclosure sale: "(1) There must be irregularity calculated to affect the
sale; and (2) The irregularity must be coupled with a grossly inadequate pur127. Schluter v. Sell, 194 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, no writ); Linz
v. Bower, 86 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, writ ref'd).
128. The court in Jeffrey v. Bond also noted the principle set forth in Hodges v. Roberts, 74 Tex. 517, 12 S.W. 222 (1889) that "any person capable of contracting may create a lien on his property to secure the debt of another without subjecting himself
to any further obligation than the lien contract gives."
129. Hoffman v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 371 F. Supp. 576
(N.D. Tex. 1974); Leisure Estates of America, Inc. v. Carmel Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp.
556 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
130. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 63-64.
131. A recent state court decision concurs with last year's rulings on this question.
Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
132. 501 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ).
133. Tax. REV. Crv.

STAT. ANN.

art. 3810 (1966) provides, in part, that "[n]otice

of such proposed sale shall be given by posting written notice thereof for three consecutive weeks prior to the day of sale ....
134. The court did acknowledge certain inconsistent dicta in Cawley v. Security State
Bank & Trust Co., 126 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ ref'd); however, as the instant court pointed out, such dicta was in fact inconsistent within itself,
since the court had miscalculated the number of days for which notice had been posted.
135. Biddle v. National Old Line Co., 513 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the note was in the principal sum of $235,000.00 and the property
was sold for $100,000.00); Delley v. Unknown Stockholders of the Brotherly and Sisterly Club of Christ, Inc., 509 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (a deed of trust covering 70% of the property secured a note which was in the
principal sum of $2,000.00, and the 70% interest in the property was sold for $500.00);
Brimberry v. First State Bank, 500 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (the evidence indicated the property had a fair market value ranging between $19,200.00 and $40,000.00, and the property was sold for $5,000.00).
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chase price.' 13 6 However, in a fourth case during the year involving claimed
irregularities and inadequacy of the selling price, this time in an execution
sale, the court held that the sale was properly set aside. 1 37 In that case, the
court acknowledged the general rule quoted above but determined that the
case fitted within the exception that "where there is inadequacy of price and
a prompt offer to pay off the indebtedness, equity will step in and set aside
the sale."' 38 In setting aside the sale on this basis, the court also gave a
quite liberal interpretation of the word "prompt" in holding that an offer two
and one-half months subsequent to the execution sale constituted a sufficiently
prompt offer.
In a case 13 9 dealing with the disposition to be made of excess proceeds
subsequent to a foreclosure sale on 206 acres of land, one claimant having
a subordinate interest in 205 acres and the other having a subordinate interest
in the remaining one acre, the court held that a pro rata sharing in the excess
proceeds on the basis of acreage was appropriate. It might be argued that
the court should have considered the fair market values of the respective
tracts in determining the basis of sharing by each claimant, especially inas,
much as the one-acre tract in this case appeared to be considerably more valable than 1/205th of the value of the 205-acre tract. In another case involving derivative claims, 40 the court held that the grantee's acceptance of
a deed containing an assumption clause in favor of a gas company created
a vendor's lien in favor of that company.
'In
Evans v. Steiner'4 ' summary judgment was held to have been improperly rendered by the trial court, since a material issue of fact remained in
controversy as to whether the mortgagor's homestead had been included in
a deed of trust, and, therefore, included in the judgment at foreclosure. The
court noted prior authority 142 to the effect that a lender cannot disregard the
mortgagor's long-time residence on a tract of land, notwithstanding the mortgagor's declaration that another tract of land constitutes his homestead.
Claims of Mechanics and Materialmen. The Supreme court in First National

Bank v. Whirlpool Corp.' 43 rendered a noteworthy opinion with respect to
the qualification of certain removable improvements for the lien provided by
the mechanic's lien laws.' 44 The court held that the supplier was entitled
136. 500 S.W.2d at 676-77.

137. Prudential Corp. v. Bazaman, 512 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi

1974, no writ).
138.

512 S.W.2d at 91, the court citing Moore v. Miller, 155 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ.

App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd). See also Saylors v. Wood, 135 Tex. 267, 140
S.W.2d 164 (1940); Cox v. Wheeler, 150 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1941, no writ).
139. Richardson v. Fort Worth Pipe & Supply Co., 511 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.

-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
140. Delley v. Unknown Stockholders of the Brotherly and Sisterly Club of Christ,

Inc., 509 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Burton-

Lingo Co. v. Standard, 217 S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1919, no writ);

Etter v. Tuck, 101 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, no writ); Gonzales v.

Zachry, 84 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, writ ref'd).
141. 511 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).

142. Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 13 S.W. 12 (1890); Blomgren

v. VanZandt, 126 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, no writ).
143. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
144. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Supp. 1974); see Youngblood, Me-
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to a preferential mechanic's lien (that is, in preference to a prior-recorded
mortgage) with respect to the dishwashers and disposals which it had installed, but not with respect to the refrigerators and ranges. In the first part
of its opinion, the court reviewed the manner of installation of the respective
appliances in order to determine which ones qualified for statutory mechanic's
lien protection. Inasmuch as each disposal and dishwasher had been physically fastened to the adjacent wall, principally through the use of screws, the
court found a sufficient incorporation in the realty to give rise to the statutory
mechanic's lien, which, as the court stated, encompasses only "realty and such
personal property as has been incorporated in or consumed in the construction or repair thereof or delivered for such purposes.' 145 However, no
mechanic's lien was deemed available with respect to the refrigerators and
ranges since they were in no way connected to the realty beyond the fact
that their cords were plugged into electrical wall outlets 1 46 (a fact of installation which may well change as the Whirlpool case is reviewed by suppliers).
Secondly, the court determined that a constitutional mechanic's lien 147 was
not available with respect to any of the appliances, the court holding that
such a lien is available with respect to manufactured chattels only when the
articles are made especially for a purchaser pursuant to a special order and
in accordance with the purchaser's specifications. Finally, the supplier's statutory lien with respect to the disposals and dishwashers was held to have priority over the prior-recorded mortgage on the principle that "a mechanic's
and materialmen's statutory lien upon improvements made is superior to a
prior recorded deed of trust lien where the improvements made can be
removed without material injury to the land and pre-existing improvements,
48
or to the improvements removed.'
Another noteworthy decision during the survey year, Alpert v. Jarrell Carpentry Co.,' 49 involved the frequently litigated question of whether a contractor, who recovers through litigation the contract sum specified in a contract
for repairs and remodeling of real property, is entitled also to recover
attorneys' fees under article 2226 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 50 In
chanics' and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26 Sw. L.J. 665, 695-97 (1972). See also
Woodward, The Hardeman Act-Some Unanswered Questions, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 2235 (1974).
145. 517 S.W.2d at 266.
146. These items were, of course, subject to a security interest under the Texas Business and Commerce Code; however, the supplier had not perfected the security interest
in a manner which would have enabled it to obtain superiority over a prior-recorded
mortgage.
147. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 36.
148. 517 S.W.2d at 269, citing Summerville v. King, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S.W. 680
(1904); Parkdale State Bank v. McCord, 428 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus
Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in Stalcup & Williams, Property, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 29, 34-35 (1969); Freed v. Bozman, 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, error ref'd n.r.e.). But see Kaspar v. Cockrell-Riggins
Lighting Co., 511 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ), which serves
as a reminder to materialmen that their liens will be defeated if identification and segregation of the items supplied is not possible. In the Kaspar case, the claimant had supplied lighting and other fixtures to a general contractor who used the materials in the
construction of an apartment complex. The supplier's lien claim was denied because its
materials could not be distinguished from similar materials furnished by other suppliers.
149. 510 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
150. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1974), which provides:
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denying attorneys' fees in this case, the court relied heavily on the 1970
supreme court opinion in Tenneco Oil Co. v. Padre Drilling Co.,1"1 and held

that the contractor's suit was not " 'for purely personal services or for labor
only,' or for 'material furnished,'" but was "based primarly upon a contract
for a product or for a general service."' 52 The court found significant the
fact that the painting and carpentry work billed to the property owner did
not constitute a "personal service" rendered to him nor "labor done" for him,
but rather constituted personal service rendered to and labor done for the contractor itself by its workmen. Similarly, the court noted that the materials
had been furnished to the contractor, not the property owner. Moreover,
in its final analysis, the court held that even if the 1971 amendments to
article 2226 had broadened the statute to permit the recovery of attorneys'
fees in a suit for "personal services rendered" and "labor done" by employees
of the claimant, the amendments could not be construed as permitting
attorneys' fees in a suit on a contract "for a product or a general service"
(emphasis added) as distinguished from "personal services rendered" or
"labor done." It is submitted that the court's opinion does not give proper
effect to the 1971 amendments to article 2226, although quite likely the fault
lies not with the court but with the statute in its overly technical delineation
of qualified classes of claimants. The 1971 amendments to article 2226
added the words "corporation, partnership, or other legal entity" after the
initial words "any person," and deleted the word "personal" which had
previously modified "services rendered." These changes probably demonstrate the legislature's intention to adopt a policy similar to that proposed in
the concurring opinion in the Tenneco decision, in which two justices
expressed the view that a corporation or other legal entity should be
permitted to recover attorneys' fees when the claim is for labor done or services rendered by such entity, through its employees, to the property owner.
However, the deletion of the word "personal"-which is never expressly
acknowledged in the Jarrell opinion-also appears to lessen the former
rigorous requirement that services be rendered directly for the property
owner. In fact, in Clark Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice' 53 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached that very conclusion.
Had the court in Jarrellgiven full recognition to this deletion, the instant contractor might have been entitled to attorneys' fees. However, as the court
pointed out, its decision, like many decisions construing the article, necessarily rested on narrow technical grounds since the statute selects certain
classes of litigants for favored treatment without "any consideration of
Any person, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a valid
claim against a person or corporation for services rendered, labor done,
material furnished

. . .

may present the same to such persons or corpora-

tion . . . and if, at the expiration of 30 days thereafter, the claim has not
been paid or satisfied, and he should finally obtain judgment -for any
amount thereof

. . .

he may.

. .

also recover, in addition to his claim and

costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's fees.
151. 453 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1970).
152. 510 S.W.2d at 141.
153. 490 F.2d 834, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1974).
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whether fairness and justice would permit an award of attorneys' fees to one
successful litigant and deny it to another."' 154 Moreover, the court in Jarrell
should at least be commended for its refusal to base its decision on the unworkable distinction between a suit on a "special contract" and a suit for the
value of labor and materials as the critical question in determining the merit
of claims for attorneys' fees, a distinction apparently rejected by the Tenneco
decision. 155
Several cases decided during the survey year involved the role of bonds
in mechanics' and materialmen's lien litigation. In Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
American Indemnity Co.156 the materialman sought to recover for painting

materials furnished and to foreclose its materialmen's lien on an apartment
project in a suit against the property owner, the original contractor, and a
subcontractor. Subsequently, the materialman sought to join the original
contractor's surety as a defendant. The supreme court held that the
attempted joinder of the surety was timely since the shorter limitation period
applicable to bonds meeting the requirements of the "Hardeman Act" (the
common name given to the applicable statutory provisions)' 5 7 did not apply
because the surety bond in this case was not a Hardeman Act bond. The
court held that in light of a substantial defect in the amount of the bond,
the provision in the bond reciting that it was executed in attempted compliance with the statute was insufficient to bring the bond within the statute's
requirements. A vigorous dissenting opinion in this case pointed out that the
legislature had clearly expressed its intent in section 8 of article 5472d to
have any bond treated as a Hardeman Act bond which "by its express terms
evidence[d] its intent to comply with this Article.' 158 In fact, the majority
opinion may have been unnecessarily strict in neglecting the obvious legislative intent, which would appear to have brought the instant bond within the
terms of the statute.' 5 9
Finally, three cases decided during the survey year examined the effect
of this state's mechanic's lien laws on voluntary protection contracted for the
benefit of subcontractors. In Johnson Service Co. v. TransamericaInsurance

Co.16 0 the court concluded that although a contractor provides a payment
154.
S.W.2d
27 Sw.
155.

510 S.W.2d at 141. See also Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. Trinity Constr. Co., 481
406 (Tex. 1972), noted in Hemingway, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
L.J. 18, 21-22 (1973).
But, as a demonstration of the illogical complexity in this area of the law, see

Clark Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 490 F.2d 834, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1974), in which
after acknowledging the deletion of the word "personal" from article 2226, the court ap-

pears to assume that the "special contracts" doctrine is still valid in Texas.

504 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1973), noted in 52 TExAs L. REv. 1447 (1974).
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-72e (Supp. 1974).
158. Id. art. 5472d.
159. After a quite thorough and perceptive analysis of this case, a student author concluded: "By holding article 5472d inapplicable in Sherwin-Williams, the majority inadvertently denied subcontractors the assurance that their claims would be paid and undermined their statutory protection. The court obfuscated the applicability of article
5472d, confused owners and subcontractors alike about the scope of protection afforded
by nonconforming bonds, permitted Sherwin-Williams to recover even though it delayed
in filing its claim, and ignored one of the primary goals of the statute-the insulation
of the owner's property from liability to aggrieved subcontractors." Note, note 156 supra, at 1459.
156.

157. Tax.

160. 485 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 266 (1974) (in which
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bond in compliance with the Hardeman Act,' such bond does not preclude
the subcontractor's action against another bond furnished voluntarily (in this
case, in order to comply with federal law) by the owner on the same project.
InLesikar Construction Co. v. Acoustex, Inc.' 62 the court allowed a subcontractor to recover against a general contractor and its bonding company and
refused to condition the contractor's recovery on a contractual provision
requiring that the subcontractor furnish the general contractor with an affidavit showing that all bills for labor and materials had been paid. And in
Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Smith' 63 the court held that subcontractors
and materialmen were entitled to contractual retainage funds in cases where
the "final payment" provision of the construction contract between the original contractor and the owner (in this case a municipality) evidenced a clear
intent to make them third party beneficiaries of such construction contract.
Hopefully, the supreme court, which has granted writ of error in the Corpus
Christi Bank case, will analyze the very careful reasoning of each of these
three courts (as well as a 1971 decision by the same appellate court which
rendered the Corpus Christi Bank decision' 16 4) and will synthesize them into
a clear exegesis of this area of the law.
IV.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE

FederalRestrictions. Calendar year 1974 ended with a sense of "mark time"
in connection with the "advancing procession of federal land use controls"
described in the 1974 Property Article.' 65 For example, the proposed
federal legislation to have been entitled the "Land Use Policy and Planning
Assistance Act," which had passed the Senate in 1973,166 stalled and expired
(at least temporarily) in the House of Representatives. As for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the beginning of the year saw it accelerate
the previous year's activities in land-use and parking-management control 6 7
by preparing (1) regulations, and then modifications to such regulations, in
connection with the review and restriction of "indirect sources" of pollution,' 68 (2) a set of technical pamphlets, entitled "Interim Guidelines for the
the student author concurs with the court's opinion), and 52 TEXAS L. REV. 773 (1974)
(in which the student author disagrees with the court's opinion).
161. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d (Supp. 1974).
162.
163.

509 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
512 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ granted).

164. Barfield v. Henderson, 471 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in Hemingway, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 18, 20-21 (1973).

165. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 53-56.

Other commentaries included Joelson &

Fleischaker, Some Significant Environmental Legislation, 20 PRAc. LAW. 29 (1974);
Wayman, Dutton & Dunn, The Adequacy of Environmental impact Statements and the
Development of State Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 630 (1973); Comment, 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Use and Abuse of the State Implementation Plan, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 232
(1974); Comment, The Environmental Protection Agency and Coastal Zone Management, 11 HoUSTON L. REV. 1152 (1974); Comment, Coordinating the EPA, NEPA, and
the Clean Air Act, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 527 (1974); Note, Environmental Law-The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969-The Influence of Agency Differences on Judicial Enforcement, 52 TEXAs L. REV. 1227 (1974).

166. See the discussion of this Act at Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 55-56.
167. Id. at 54-55.
168. 39 Fed. Reg. 7270 ('Feb. 25, 1974), explained and modified by 39 Fed. Reg.
25292 (July 9, 1974).
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Review of the Impact of Indirect Sources on Ambient Air Quality" and (3)
proposed parking-management rules 16 9 for implementing the previous year's
"transportation and land use control" regulations. 170 Just as in 1973 when
the EPA had introduced the concept of an "indirect source" of pollution
(such as certain types of shopping centers and other real estate developments), 171 so in 1974 in the "parking-management" rules the EPA introduced the concept of reducing "vehicle miles traveled" (VMT) ;172 and this
year's newcomer was no less of a bombshell. In fact, the EPA's "parkingmanagement" contribution to the law of environmental control, if sustained,
could have a far more serious effect on real estate development than its "indirect source" regulations. Whereas the "indirect source" regulations are currently limited in scope to the reduction of local carbon monoxide concentrations, primarily through engineering design to promote more efficient traffic
flow and less stop-and-go driving, the "parking-management" rules with their

emphasis on VMT would, for example, require shopping center developers
covered by such rules to submit scientific data, a market analysis, or some
other quantitative study "illustrating that customers will travel shorter distances to stop than they would if the new facility were not constructed.'1 7 3
However, the development of these regulations by the EPA was at least
temporarily halted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir175 and even by the EPA itself.' 76
cuit,' 74 then by the United States Congress,
169. 39 Fed. Reg. 30440 (Aug. 22, 1974).
170. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30626 (Nov. 6, 1973) for the "Texas Plan" of transportation
and land use controls.
171. 38 Fed. Reg. 6279 (March 8, 1973) (originally adopting the label "complex
source"); 38 Fed. Reg. 9599 (April 18, 1973) (switching to "indirect source"); 38 Fed.
Reg. 15834 (June 18, 1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 7270 (Feb. 25, 1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 25292
(July 9, 1974).
172. "In order to achieve the applicable standards [i.e., National Ambient Air Quality Standards], it is also necessary to develop and implement transportation controls
which both reduce emissions from in-use vehicles on the road and reduce the vehicle
miles traveled by the vehicles in the affected area." 39 Fed. Reg. 30440 (Aug. 22,
1974) (emphasis added). Inasmuch as the type of automobile travel (whether continuous or stop-and-start) has a considerable impact on the type and concentration of pollutants emitted from the automobile, the above conclusion by the EPA has been subjected to serious challenges.
173. ICSC State Environmental Action Committee Bulletin, EPA Issues Proposed
Amendments to Parking Regulations (Aug. 28, 1974). In this author's opinion, the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) has developed the most sophisticated
framework of information gathering and political action resources of any real estate organization which monitors environmental developments.
174. In Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974),
noted in 60 A.B.A.J. 1439 (1974), the Fifth Circuit postponed implementation of the
"Texas Plan," see note 170 supra, until further ambient air quality data had been assembled in connection with air quality controls imposed by the Texas Air Quality Control Board. But see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 942 (1974) (No.
73-1742), noted in 52 TExAs L. REV. 1217 (1974), in which the EPA's approval of the
State of Georgia implementation plan was rejected.
175. In the Agricultural-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriation Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-563, § 510,-88 Stat. 1822, advocates of EPA "mark time," led
to a considerable degree by Congressman Bob Casey of Houston, were successful in adding the following provision: "No part of any funds appropriated under this Act may
be used by the Environmental Protection Agency to administer any program to tax,
limit, or otherwise regulate parking facilities."
176. On December 23, 1974, the EPA announced its suspension of indirect source
implementation procedures until further notice. It also stated that facilities which are
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Finally, in two opinions issued during the year, the Attorney General of
Texas advised the Texas Air Quality Control Board that it had no current
authority to assist the EPA in enforcing the federal law.177
Local Restrictions. A frequently raised issue in zoning cases is whether a
particular rezoning of a small area constitutes unwarranted "spot zoning."" 81
In Burkett v. City of Texarkana179 certain property owners challenged as
"spot zoning" a rezoning ordinance which had changed the classification of
a city block from a single-family residential district to a two-family residential
district to permit duplexes. The question presented on appeal was whether
the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying the temporary injunction
sought by the plaintiffs. After defining "spot zoning" to be a "process of
singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification different and inconsistent with that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of that
parcel and to the detriment of the rights of other property owners,' ' 180 the
court emphasized that the amendatory zoning ordinance did not on its face
demonstrate that it was passed either for the benefit of a particular property
owner or to the detriment of other property owners. The Court therefore
concluded that the trial judge had not abused its discretion in denying the
temporary injunction; however, it pointed out to the plaintiffs that they still
would have an opportunity for a trial on the merits if they pursued an action
for permanent injunction. In a second "spot zoning" case, Thompson v. City
of Palestine,'8 ' a would-be shopping center developer was not successful.
The lower court had upheld the zoning change of the developer's 4.1-acre
tract, concluding after an extensive analysis of the relevant law that a change
in the condition of an area is not a prerequisite to a change in zoning as
long as the amendatory zoning "bears a reasonable relation to the general
welfare, to an ordered plan of development and does not constitute spot zoning. .... -182 The supreme court, apparently determining that the last category of the lower court's guidelines begged the question of the case, stated
that any presumption of validity normally given to city ordinances "disappears if it is shown that a city acted arbitrarily rather than on the basis of
'183
changed conditions.
commenced prior to July 1, 1975, will not be subject to indirect source regulation.

39

Fed. Reg. 45014 (Dec. 30, 1974).
177. TEx. Arr'Y GEN. Op. Nos. H-222, H-455 (1974).

178. "Arbitrary, or 'spot' zoning to accommodate the desires of a particular landowner is not only contrary to good zoning practices, but violates the rights of neighboring landowners and is contrary to the intent of the enabling legislation which contem-

plates planned zoning based upon the welfare of an entire neighborhood." Smith v.
County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 406 P.2d 545, 547 (1965). See also Hunt v. City
of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1971), noted in 26 Sw. L.J. 213, 219-20 (1972);

City of Lubbock v. Whitacre, 414 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), noted in 22 Sw. L.J. 200, 204-05 (1968); Annot., Spot Zoning, 51
A.L.R.2d 263 (1957). CI. Time Control, Sequential Zoning: The Ramapo Case, 25
BAYLOR

L.REv. 318 (1973).

179. 500 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
180. Id. at 244.

181. 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974).
182. Thompson v. City of Palestine, 502 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler

1973), rev'd, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974).
183. 510 S.W.2d at 582. The supreme court relied primarily on Hunt v. City of San
Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1971), noted in 26 Sw. L.J. 213, 219-20 (1972).
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,In contrast to the Thompson case, the principle of judicial deference to
the zoning power of municipalities was evidenced both at the state and federal court levels during the survey year. In Charlestown Homeowners Association v. LaCoke,l8 4 for example, the trial court had upheld a zoning change
of a thirty-five-acre tract from "residential" to "planned development," concluding that it must defer to the decision of the zoning authority if reasonable
minds might differ as to whether the particular zoning regulations had a substantial relation to the public health, safety,. morals, or general welfare. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that because the evidence raised such reasonable differences of opinion, resolution of the question lay within the discretion of the legislative agency rather than the courts. The opinion is
replete with language to the effect that the legislative agency "could have"
reasonably concluded that the zoning change was unwarranted. Such language should alert property owners to the concept of judicial deference in
the area of zoning, thus making it imperative that they present their strongest
and best arguments to the applicable agency. Similarly, in Blackman v. City
of Big Sandy18 5 the federal district court acknowledged that local zoning is
not subject ,to federal court review unless the complaining property owner can
show that the zoning is arbitrary and capricious.
The effect of zoning ordinances on restrictive covenants running with the
land was analyzed in the case of City of Gatesville v. Powell.186 In that case
the plaintiff's property, already subjected to restrictive covenants limiting the
use of the property to residential or commercial purposes, was included in
a new zoning ordinance which further limited the property to residential use.
The plaintiff challenged the zoning ordinance and obtained a judgment from
the trial court to the effect that the zoning ordinance was invalid with regard
to the plaintiff's lands because it would destroy the existing restrictive covenants. In a well-reasoned opinion, the appellate court held that when a zoning ordinance restricts the use of property more than has already been done
by existing restrictive covenants, the zoning should be given full effect since
it does not adversely affect the existing restrictive covenants.
,In a case involving a mandamus action to compel issuance of a building
permit, the property owner succeeded at trial only to be reversed upon
appeal. In City of Dallas v. Crownrich'8 7 the Dallas Department of Planning
and Urban Development proposed in March 1972 that a certain area be designated an historic district, restricting future development. In June 1972 the
city council instructed the planning department to prepare an historical preservation ordinance to effectuate that proposal. In January 1973 the city
planning commission recommended that such ordinance be enacted, and on
February 1, 1973, the planning commission conducted a public hearing on
184. 507 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

185. 377 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Tex. 1974). The facts of that case do indicate a certain
planned course of action by the City of Big Sandy to prevent the plaintiff from selling
liquor from his property. In fact, the plaintiff may have been more successful in state
court where he would not have had to prove a federal question as well as illegal zoning
changes.
186. 500 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

this recommendation. On February 9, 1973, the plaintiff applied for a
building permit to construct a high rise apartment building on his property
in the area under study. Subsequently, on March 12, 1973, the city
council passed an ordinance which authorized the city to rezone certain
historical areas, including the area in question, such rezoning to have the effect of prohibiting the destruction of any building with historic, architectural,
or cultural importance. The ordinance also granted to the zoning authority
the power to regulate the erection of new buildings in an historic area. A
week later the city council passed a resolution prohibiting the issuance of
building permits in a certain zoning classification (to which the plaintiff's
property belonged) until the question of historic preservation could be resolved. On April 10, 1973, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandamus
seeking to compel the issuance of a building permit, and the following month
the trial court granted his writ and directed the chief building inspector to
issue a permit for the plaintiff's highrise. The appellate court reversed, noting that even though no zoning ordinance had been enacted at the time of
the plaintiff's application for a building permit, a city under the authority of
its police power could maintain the status quo of an area when a zoning plan
is under consideration or pending at the time a party applies for a building
permit. The court also held that an applicant obtains no vested right by
merely filing for a building permit and that he is therefore subject to a zoning
ordinance adopted after the filing of his application. The court reasoned that
the process of passing zoning ordinances can require a substantial amount of
time and that it would be inconsistent with the grant of the zoning power
to cities to allow individuals to circumvent proposed zoning by rushing for
a building permit before rezoning could take effect. ,However, the court's
holding was limited to the denial of building permits for a reasonable period
of time and only if the proposed zoning was contemplated before the appli188
cation for a permit.
A conflict between a city's zoning power and the rights of a school district
was the question in dispute in Austin Independent School District v. City of
Sunset Valley1 s9 where the supreme court held that a city was without power
to prevent totally the location of school facilities within its borders by use
of zoning regulations. In reversing the lower court, the supreme court first
distinguished the instant case from cases cited by the city, involving the issue
of whether a school district must comply with zoning ordinances dealing with
building regulations. The court noted that such cases turned on the police
power of the city to enforce necessary health and safety regulations related
to construction and that no such regulations were present in the instant case.
The court concluded that while a city may validly subject a school district's
188. Although this instant case appears to have been a good "test case" for the city,
the rule of law espoused by the court is not universally accepted. See Cooper v. Dubow,

342 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dept. 1973); Annot., Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulation,
in Absence of Savings Clause, on Pending Application for Building Permit, 50 A.L.R.3d

596 (1973).
189. 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973).
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construction to legitimate building regulations, it may not, in the absence of
the school district's unreasonableness or nuisance, prevent a school district
from locating a facility within its borders. 190 The court further implied, with
two judges failing to concur on this point, that a school district's activities,
unless proven to be unreasonable, are not subject to the zoning power of a
191
city.
Finally, in Board of Adjustment v. Willie,' 92 the court reaffirmed the prin193
cipal that, although Texas law permits zoning boards to grant variances,
a variance is not authorized by the statute "merely to accommodate the highest and best use of the property," in the instant case, apparently a multistoried office building or motor hotel, inconsistent with the 35-foot maximum
building height, but rather, a variance is appropriate only "where the zoning
94
ordinance does not permit any reasonable use."'
Private Restrictive Covenants. Two cases decided during the survey year
concerned the attempted characterization of mobile homes as conventional
homes in order to comply with restrictive covenants requiring conventional
housing. In Bullock v. Kattner the defendant had moved a mobile home
onto a lot of a subdivision having the following restriction: "No trailer,basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out buildings erected in this subdivision shall at any time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently,
nor shall any structure of a temporary character be used as a residence."' 95
Because the defendant had removed the wheels of his mobile home and had
permanently connected it to the lot by means of water pipes, electricity lines,
and block foundations, the trial court held that the mobile home was not a
"trailer" within the meaning of the restriction. The court of appeals reversed, holding that as a matter of law the mobile home was a "trailer" within
the meaning of the restriction. The court placed great emphasis on the term
"or permanently" in the restriction, using it to distinguish prior cases,' 9 6 and
concluded that such term revealed the intent of the homeowners in the sub190. In fact, the city did not contest the fact that arbitrary exclusion would be unconstitutional. Compare the following cases on exclusionary zoning: Appeal of Girsh, 437
Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), noted in 24 Sw. L.J. 838 (1970) (attempted exclusion
of apartments held unconstitutional); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (1974) (attempted restriction of a seniorcitizen residential community to persons over 52 years of age held unconstitutional).
Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), noted in 6 ST. MARY'S L. REV.
495 (1974) (zoning ordinance which prevents unrelated persons from sharing a residence held constitutional); East Pikeland Township v. Bush Bros., 319 A.2d 701 (Pa.
1974) (attempted exclusion of mobile home parks held unconstitutional).
191. The court's shifting of the burden appeared to be based upon the dual rationales
of the public's need for schools and the school districts' legislative power to acquire property through eminent domain. TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. §§ 23.26(a), 23.31 (1972).
192. 511 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011(g) (Supp. 1974).
194. Board of Adjustment v. Willie, 511 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), citing Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, 218 S.W.2d 286
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, no writ); 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.48 (1968); Goodwin, Recent Decisions, 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 228 (1948). See
also Zoning Variance Criteria-Viewpoints of Lawyers, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.
33 (1973).
195. 502 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Hussey v. Ray, 462 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, no writ); Crawford v. Boyd, 453 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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division to restrict even those mobile homes which are connected to their respective lots. In Atkins v. Fine1 97 the restrictive covenant in question prohibited the moving of any buildings onto the defendant's property other than
"new ready-built homes." The defendants after purchasing lots so restricted
and with full knowledge of the restriction, had moved a mobile home onto
the lots, had removed the wheels and bolted it to a concrete foundation and
had constructed and attached a new den, a carport, a sunporch and a gabled
roof. Finally, they had covered the structure with wooden walls attached
to the roof. The trial court held that the structure violated the restrictive
covenants and issued a mandatory injunction ordering removal of the structure. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendants' argument that
the term "ready-built homes" was broad enough to encompass the altered mobile home. Relying upon stipulations that an expert witness would testify
that ready-built homes are simply conventional homes constructed at various
business locations and then moved onto a buyer's property with standard
housemoving equipment, the court held that such expert testimony established the meaning of a trade term or the local sense of the term and that
the defendants' mobile home was not within the scope of the term "readybuilt home."
The case of Collum v. Neuhoff' 98 might well be labelled the "Catch-22"
of restrictive covenants. In that case the defendants wished to construct a
swimming pool on their property, but within twenty-five feet of a "park line"
in their addition. Unfortunately for the defendants, restrictive covenants applicable to their property prohibited the construction of a fence within twentyfive feet of such "park line" while a city ordinance prohibited the construction of a swimming pool without a surrounding fence. The trial court found
the covenants enforceable upon the following two theories: (1) that the restriction against the defendants' fence was a negative covenant running with
the land and (2) that the restriction was imposed as part of a general plan
or scheme for the development of the addition, and since the defendants accepted their property with notice of the restriction it was binding as an equitable servitude against the defendants personally. After analyzing the cases
and secondary authority relevant to both theories, 19 9 the appellate court concluded that the restriction on the defendants' land was a covenant running
with the land, thereby rendering unnecessary any finding that it was part of
a general plan of development. One dissenting judge observed that a general
plan of development, while not necessary to establish a covenant running with
the land, may be relevant to a determination of the inducement and consideration for the covenant and therefore also relevant to issues regarding its enforceability. The dissenting judge in fact concluded that since there was no
197. 508 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
198. 507 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
199. Among the authorities cited were Blasser v. Cass, 158 Tex. 560, 314 S.W.2d 807
(1958); Ortiz v. Jeter, 479 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with the Land
at Law, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 419 (1949); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land:
Equitable Servitudes, 28 TP~xAs L. REv. 194 (1949).
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evidence of a similar fence setback restriction in other lots, he would reverse
the trial court. In denying the defendants' motion for rehearing the court,
obviously in response to the dissent, noted that the record did contain evidence of a general plan or scheme for development.
'In Lehmann v. Wallace200 the "general plan of development" concept, essentially overlooked in the Collum case, proved invaluable to the successful
plaintiffs. In the Lehmann case the plaintiff's tract within a subdivision had
been restricted to prohibit the construction of more than one primary residence. The restrictions stated that their purpose was "to carry out a general
plan of development" of the subdivision, and in fact the subdividers had executed an affidavit and agreement for the plaintiffs in which they had covenanted and agreed to attach and incorporate similar restrictions in each conveyance (although testimony revealed that only seventy-three percent of the
deeds executed by the subdividers actually contained the restrictions). Subsequently, the subdividers conveyed by separate deeds both halves of an existing tract to the owner-defendants, designating the half-tracts as 12-A and
12-B. After the owner-defendants had constructed a residence upon 12-B
and had announced their anticipated construction of a second residence on
12-A, the plaintiffs brought suit -against the subdividers and the ownerdefendants. The appellate court, in affirming the trial court's injunction
against construction of the second residence, rejected the defendants' arguments that the covenants were unenforceable against the owner-defendants.
The court held that a "general plan of development" necessary to enforce
restrictions can be established in various ways such as by express covenant,
by implication from a filed map, by parol representations made in sales brochures, maps, and advertising, and by oral statements on which the purchaser
relies in making his purchase. The court then concluded that the necessary
requisites for the "general plan of development" had been proved in this case
and that such plan prohibited the subdivision of tracts into small tracts for
separate development. Indeed, any other decision would have been inequitable in light of the facts of the case.
V.

LANDLORD-TENANT

Although no appellate decisions under the 1973 landlord-tenant legislation201 were reported during the survey year, the Attorney General of Texas
rendered an opinion 20 2 that article 5236c, added to the Texas statutes in
1973,203 applies to short-term or weekly tenancies as well as tenancies of a
longer term. 20 4 In another opinion2 15 the attorney general held that a tenant

is subject to prosecution under section 31.04 of the new Penal Code for "theft
200. 510 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. See Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 58-61, for a review of that legislation.
202. TEx. Arr', GEN. Op.No. H-377 (1974).
203. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236c (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of this
particular article see Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 59-60.
204. The opinion also reiterated the generally recognized rule that abandonment of
the premises consists of an intent to abandon and actual relinquishment of possession.
205. TEx. Arr', GEN. OP. No. H-356 (1974).
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of service" 20 6 if he knowingly pays his rent with a worthless check, provided
that the tenant's right to possession under the lease is expressly made contingent upon the payment of rent. The latter opinion should have a significant effect on landlord-tenant relations because, although a tenant generally
realizes that he can be prosecuted for the issuance of a bad check under section 32.41 of the new Penal Code, 20 7 a misdemeanor, the attorney general
now has given authority for prosecution under the theft provisions of section
31.04, which can result in a second-degree felony charge, depending on the
amount of the rental check.
Two significant cases decided during the survey period involved the applicability of Texas' statutes of frauds 20 8 to leasing situations. In McCloud v.
Knopp20 9 a tenant brought action for a declaratory judgment to determine
her right to enforce an oral lease for her lifetime tenancy on certain realty.
Although both statutes of frauds provide that a lease of real estate for a term
longer than one year is not enforceable unless the agreement is in writing,
the court held that the lease was not within the prohibition of either statute
since the term of the lease depended upon a contingency that might occur
before a year had elapsed, i.e., the tenant's death within one year. Although
not mentioned in McCloud decision, the court's ruling would appear to be
contrary to the decision in Nitschke v. Doggett,2 10 discussed in the 1974 Property Article,21 . which held that a lease "for the balance of the life of the tenant" constituted a tenancy at will and not an estate for years. In the
McCloud decision the court, which noted substantial authority in support of
its holding,212 determined not only that such an agreement would be enforceable as a lease (and thus not merely a tenancy at will) but also that it did
not require a written memorandum to be enforced. In McDonald v.
Roemer 21 3 the court held that a year-to-year tenancy, with either party having the right to terminate the tenancy at the end of any annual term, was
not within the statute of frauds. The court noted the well-established rule
that a lease for a primary term of one year, with an option in the tenant
to extend the term, constitutes a demise for the entire primary-plus-option
period, and is thus within the statutes of frauds. On the other hand, a oneyear lease authorizing the tenant's renewal only with permission by the lessor
is not within the statute of frauds; and the court properly viewed the termi206.
207.
208.
§ 26.01
209.
210.

TEx. PEN. CODE ANm. § 31.04 (1974).
Id. § 32.41.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1288 (1962); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
(1968).
507 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
489 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 498

S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1973).

211. Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 62.
212. Warner v. Texas & P. Ry., 164 U.S. 418 (1896); Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147
Tex. 106, 213 S.W.2d 530 (1948); Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473, 154 S.W.2d
637 (1941). See also Perren v. Baker Hotel, 228 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1950, no writ), which was erroneously described in the 1974 Property Article,
Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 62 n.233, as being consistent with the Nitschke decision but
which this author now concludes to be inconsistent-by implication with the Nitschke decision.
213. 505 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974, no writ).
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nation provision in the instant case as falling within the ambit of the latter
category.
The rights and obligations of subtenants received judicial attention during
the year. The fact that there is no privity of contract between a subtenant
and the original landlord was reiterated and embellished in one case, 214 the
court holding that a paragraph in the sublease to the effect that such sublease was "subject to all terms and conditions of . . . [the primary lease]"

did not obligate the subtenant, in order to exercise his renewal option, to give
the same sixty-day notice which the tenant-sublessor was required to give to
the landlord. The court interpreted the quoted phrase as being merely an
acknowledgment of the subtenant's inferior status and not an incorporation
of all lease terms into the sublease. Regardless of the wisdom of the court's
contracual interpretation, the obvious lesson in the case for sublease drafting is to set out fully all of the subtenant's obligations in the sublease. In
fact, the failure of a sublease to specify clearly the subtenant's obligations
resulted in loss to the tenant-sublessor in yet another case decided during the
survey year.21 5 In that case the court held that the subtenant's agreement
to assume the tenant-sublessor's obligations under the primary lease was not
so clear and unequivocal as to constitute an agreement to indemnify the
tenant-sublessor for damages, resulting from violations of the primary lease
which had occurred prior to the sublease.
The appurtenant rights of tenants were dealt with in two cases decided
during the survey year. In one case216 the court acknowledged the general
principle that when a lease for a certain term expires, a tenant is not entitled
to crops planted on the demised premises at such a time that they cannot
mature before expiration of the lease. Nevertheless, the court held that because the landlord knew the crop could not mature during the term of the
lease and still consented to or acquiesced in its planting or cultivation the
subtenant was entitled to the crops. 217 Likewise in Texas City Dike &
Marina, Inc. v. Stikes21 8 the tenant was successful in establishing his claim
to appurtenant rights. There the tenant sought judgment declaring his right
to a parking easement on property retained by the landlords. In declaring
that the tenant was entitled to the parking easement, the court held that the
landlords were estopped by their representations to deny that such an easement existed. The court found that a parking area was necessary to the success of the tenant's business, and since the landlords had known this fact and
had made representations in connection with it, the doctrine of estoppel in
pais prevented them from denying it. 219 One concurring judge 220 explained
214. Board v. B & B Vending Co., 512 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,

no writ).
215. Manges v. Willoughby, 505 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. Beken v. Elstner, 503 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973,

no writ).

217. See Miller v. Gray, 136 Tex. 196, 149 S.W.2d 582 (1941). See also Crow v.
Ball, 99 S.W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
218. 500 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. Id. at 957. "Estoppel in pais precludes a litigant from asserting or denying anything which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth by such litigant's
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that more than permissive use of the parking area was shown by the evidence,
in that the landlords had accepted rentals from the tenant based on revenues
from the tenant's customers who continually used the parking area, and further, the landlords' reversionary interest in the demised premises was benefited by the tenant's improvements of the leasehold which necessarily gave
rise to the need for more parking as customers increased in number. The
court's finding of estoppel would certainly appear justified in light of the facts
revealed in the concurring opinion.
In Ace Drugs Marts, Inc. v. Sterling221 the court permitted reformation of
a unilateral mistake in the lease, contrary to the general rule that reformation
is available only in the situation of a mutual mistake. In ordering reformation of an apparent typographical error (inserting "lessor" instead of "lessee"
in the utility payment clause of the lease), the court properly relied on two
earlier decisions, one holding that reformation was appropriate when the mistake of one party was accompanied by inequitable conduct of the other
party, 222 and another decision holding that knowledge by one party of the
other's mistake makes reformation an appropriate remedy. 223 The facts of
the instant case were found to fall within both of these noted exceptions to
the general rule providing for reformation only upon mutual mistake.
As usual courts reviewed various tort claims against landlords and tenants
by invitees suffering injuries on or near the demised premises. The general
rule that a landlord is not liable for injury to any person entering under the
tenant's title or by the tenant's invitation was held to bar a tenant's business
invitee from recovery against the landlord in Wallace v. Horn.2 24 The court's
decision was consistent with the well-recognized rule set forth in Morton v.
Burton-Lingo Co. 225 and is noteworthy primarily for its succinct listing of
the general exceptions to that rule. The court noted that Texas cases had
recognized the landlord's liability to the tenant's invitees for injuries resulting from unsafe conditions on the premises where the landlord had
agreed to make repairs, 226 where the landlord could be charged with fraud
or concealment in failure to disclose hidden facts, 22 7 where the landlord
had retained control over certain portions of the premises, 228 and where229
a
nuisance on the premises had existed when the premises were leased.
However, none of those exceptions were deemed applicable in the Wallace
own conduct or representation." Rust v. Eastex Oil Co., 511 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
220. 500 S.W.2d at 957.
221. 502 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
222. Conn v. Hagan, 93 Tex. 334, 55 S.W. 323 (1900).
223. Warren v. Osborne, 154 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, writ
ref'd w.o.m.).
224. 506 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where
the injured invitee was a paying guest at a motel operated by the tenant.
225. 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.W.2d 239 (1941).

226. id.

227. Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47 (1943); Perez v. Raybaud,
76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (1890).
228. O'Connor v. Andrews, 81 Tex. 28, 16 S.W. 628 (1891); Taylor v. Gilbert Gertner Enterprises, 466 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1971, writ refd
n.r.e.).
229. Perez v.Raybaud,76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (1890).
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case. A variation of the third exception noted above was applied in another
case decided during the survey year, 23 0 where the court denied the plaintiff
recovery against a tenant for injuries sustained in a fall on the walkway outside the tenant's demised premises. The court held that the tenant was not
responsible for the maintenance of premises not exclusively leased to it.
A few cases decided during the survey year dealt with actions by landlords
against their tenants for lease defaults. In Nielson v. Okies 231 the court applied the general rule that, in an action for wrongful damages to the premises
by a tenant, a landlord may recover the reasonable cost of repairs which may
be necessary to restore the damaged property to its condition immediately
prior to the injury. 2 2 In that case, where the landlord prior to trial had
made only $247 of the estimated $3,900 of needed repairs, the court further
held that in determining damages it is immaterial whether the landlord actually makes the repairs. A similar measure of damages was utilized in another decision,2 33 the court citing considerable authority2 3 4 for the proposition
that when a tenant fails to discharge his obligation to return the demised
premises in good condition, the landlord may recover as damages the reasonable cost of repairs to place the property in its original condition.
Tenants' actions for wrongful eviction, actual or constructive, were prevalent during the survey year. In one action for wrongful eviction2 3 5 the court
held that although the evidence did not support a judgment for exemplary
damages, such recovery would be available for the landlord's breach of a
lease contract if the breach were shown to have been "accompanied by malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct, or to have occurred in such a man23 6
ner as to constitute a tort, accompanied by fraud, malice or oppression.
No cases were cited in support of this statement, and it would appear to be
contrary to the holding in Boswell v. Hughes.23 7 In Boswell 23 8 the court
stated that regardless of the nature of the conduct accompanying a breach
of contract (in that case, the wrongful foreclosure of a mortgage), if the remedy lies in contract, exemplary damages are not available. The financial significance of this issue and the apparent frequency of litigation on this point
seem to justify a definitive statement in the area by the supreme court. Several established principles were reiterated in Rust v. Eastex Oil Co., 239 all
relating to partial or total constructive eviction. In that case the court found
230. Renfro v. Giant Foods, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1973, no writ).

231. 503 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ).
232. Pasadena State Bank v. Issac, 149 Tex. 47, 228 S.W.2d 127 (1950); Hill & Hill

Truck Line, Inc. v. Powell, 319 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ).
233. Dunlap v. Mars Plumbing Supply Co., 504 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.--San
Antonio 1973, no writ).

234. Baroid Div., Nat'l Lead Co. v. Early, 390 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ); J.L. Whitworth Estate v. Mangels of Texas, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 851
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ); 35 TEX. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 102
(1962).

235. Van Sickle v. Clark, 510 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no

writ).

236. Id. at 669.
237.

491 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ refd n.r.e.).

238. For a discussion of this case see Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 48.
239. 511 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
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actionable eviction in the landlord's dismantling of the rented building several
days prior to its notice to the tenant to vacate. 240 A final case, where the
241
court found that the facts supported the finding of a constructive eviction,
is mentioned primarily for its enumeration of the elements necessary to establish constructive eviction, as previously set forth in the often-cited case of
Stillman v. Youmans. 2 42 The essential elements are as follows: (1) An intention on the part of the landlord that the tenant shall no longer enjoy the
premises, which intention may be inferred from the circumstances; (2) a material act by the landlord which substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of the premises for the purpose for which they are let; (3) such act
permanently depriving the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the premises;
and (4) an abandonment of the premises by the tenant within a reasonable
time after the commission of the act. 243 A case which should be noted with
care by landlords and tenants alike is Glau-Mya ParapsychologyTraining Institute, Inc. v. Royal Life Insurance Co., 244 where the court held that a prior

forcible entry and detainer action between the parties was res judicata as to
the present action for a declaratory judgment. Both suits were held primarily to involve the question of possession of the premises, although it is arguable that the later declaratory judgment was essentially concerned with matters of title. The decision should serve as a warning to the parties to a forcible entry and detainer suit that such suit may in fact determine more than
the issue presently being litigated.
The landlord's continuing dilemma as to the extent of self-help measures
which may be utilized in recovering possession of the demised premises upon
the tenant's default or termination under the lease was at issue in Emby v.
Bel-Aire Corp.2 45 Upon the tenant's refusal to vacate the premises of a mobile home park following a proper termination of his tenancy by the landlord
under express provisions of the lease, the landlord terminated utility services
to the house trailer while the tenant was out of the city. Termination of utility services was accomplished by flipping a switch on a utility pole (cutting
off the electric service) and turning a valve under the house trailer (shutting
240. However, judgment was ultimately rendered in favor of the landlord in the Rust
case since the tenant's pleading established the landlord's statute of frauds defense as
a matter of law.
241. Steinberg v. Medical Equip. Rental Servs., Inc., 505 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ), finding that evidence that the landlord had allowed trucks
to be parked at or near the entrance to tenant's place of business and had allowed trash
containers to be placed in such proximity to the entrance that trash and foreign substances blew into tenant's place of business was sufficient to constitute constructive eviction on the basis of substantial interference by the landlord.
242. 266 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, no writ).
243. See Ravkind v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bifano v. Econo Builders, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 670
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Edwards v. Ward Associates, Inc., 367
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Richker v. Georgandis, 323
S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hoover v. Wukasch, 274
S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd). See also Annot., Constructive
Eviction, 91 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963); Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Landlord-Tenant Relationships: The Necessity of Application in Texas, 5 ST. MARY's
L.J. 64, 75-77 (1973).
244. 507 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
245. 508 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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off the gas service), the court holding that such action by the landlord was
permissible under the general rule that one entitled to possession of premises
has the right to re-enter the premises so long as such right is exercised peaceably and without force or violence. 246 Although one would have to agree
with the court that flipping a switch and turning a valve is peaceable and
without force or violence, the distinction between this conduct and that of
the lessor in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey247 in picking a lock, which was held
248
to constitute entry by force or violence, would seem to be tenuous at best.
The rule which requires these technical distinctions to be made on a caseby-case and fact-by-fact basis places an unreasonable burden on landlords,
who must hazard a guess as to the appropriate extent of self-help measures
which they may utilize in recovering their premises after the tenant's wrongful
breach of lease. Although a re-examination of self-help rules would seem
to be warranted, 249 the supreme court unfortunately refused to accept the
challenge in reviewing the case of Big Country Homes, Inc. v. Christianson, 25 0 where the appellate court had approved the landlord's seizure of four
246. See Heironimus v. Duncan, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 610, 33 S.W. 287 (1895, no writ).
247. 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ dism'd).
248. The Smithey case, which involved merely a plea of privilege and therefore did
not reach the question as to how much damages occurred in the landlord's picking of
the tenant's lock, has been the source of much analysis-and consternation. See Stalcup
& Williams, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 29, 30-31 (1969), which
infers from the Smithey case the essential prerequisite of notice prior to the landlord's
self-help (which the landlord in the Smithey case had failed to give but which had to
some extent been given by the landlord in the instant case). However, that article also
emphasizes the forcible entry aspect of the Smithey case, there having been no entry
in the instant case. See also Annot., Right of Landlord Legally Entitled To Possession
To Dispossess Tenant Without Legal Process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966), the supplement
to which in this author's opinion incorrectly reports the Smithey case as being a per se
rejection of the landlord's picking a lock.
249. For Texas cases which appear contradictory to the Smithey decision, and to the
analyses of that case set out in the preceding footnote, see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rios, 96
Tex. 174, 71 S.W. 275 (1903) (permitting the repossession of a sewing machine despite
the objections of the person using the machine at the time of repossession); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ dism'd),
and Collins v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 454 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1970, no writ) (two of numerous automobile repossession cases in Texas, with the court
in each case upholding the creditor's actions under facts that somewhat parallel the
Smithey method of "retaking"); Harris v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 163 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (the landlord's destruction of the demised
premises was not challenged by the tenant; and although the tenant did challenge the
landlord's removal of personal property within the premises, the court upheld the landlord's actions); Runnels Chevrolet Co. v. Clifton, 46 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1932, no writ) (another automobile repossession case, with the court providing a good analysis for allowing self-help in the absence of "forcible resistance"); Phoenix Furniture Co. v. McCracken, 3 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1928, no
writ) (permitting the repossession of furniture through actions much more threatening
than in the Smithey case); Henderson v. Beggs, 207 S.W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1918, no writ) (the landlord's changing of the lock to the demised premises was
held to be valid, although the landlord's conversion of the tenant's personal property was
held to be invalid in the absence of a lease provision permitting it); Heironimus v. Duncan, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 610, 33 S.W. 287 (1895, no writ). Texas cases which deny
self-help appear to be distinguishable from Smithey because in these cases force was
used. See, e.g., Loftus v. Maxey, 72 Tex. 242, 11 S.W. 272 (1889); Godwin v. Stanley,
331 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also, in addition to Annot., supra note 248, Annot., What Conduct by Repossessing Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Vendor Entails Tort Liability, 99 A.L.R.2d 358 (1965).
250. 513 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974), writ ref'd n.r.e., 519 S.W.2d
845 (Tex. 1975).
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mobile homes owned by his tenant. The supreme court's per curiam "n.r.e."
refusal of the tenant's application for writ of error made clear the fact that
the court would "express no opinion on the other issues discussed and other
points of error ruled upon by the court of civil appeals ,' 251 the principal point
in issue having been the abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a
temporary injunction.
Finally, brief mention will be given to the increasing antitrust attacks on
restrictive covenants in commercial leases. 25 2 Although such covenants appear to be generally recognized in Texas,2 53 with a limited, if somewhat puzzling, exception, 25 4 and have withstood fairly well all private challenges in federal courts,25 5 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has made clear its intentions to attack them vigorously, at least as they are imposed by major tenants and by owners of large shopping centers. During the survey year the
two major prongs of the current phase of 'FTC attack were completed, in the
form of consent orders rendered against a major department chain 256 and a
regional shopping center. 257 Although the FTC attack does not in itself invalidate restrictive covenants in this state, it should alert lease negotiators to
analyze carefully the form of restrictive covenant being negotiated (perhaps
attempting to follow the consent order guidelines) and to include specific severability clauses in restrictive covenant sections of each lease.

251. 519 S.W.2d at 845.

252. See Note, The Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping
Center Leases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1973); Annot., Validity, Construction, and Effect of Lessor's Covenant Against Use of His Other Property in Competition With the
Lessee-Covenantee, 97 A.L.R.2d 4 (1964).
253. See Celli & Del Papa v. Galveston Brewing Co., 227 S.W. 941 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); Butts v. Somers, 441 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1969, no writ); Neiman-Marcus v. Hexter, 412 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Gulf Ref. Co., 279 S.W. 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1925, writ ref'd); Redland Fruit Co. v. Sargent, 113 S.W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no

writ).
254. In Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp., 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963), the "exclusive" given to a tenant by the owners of two contiguous shopping center tracts was held
to be an illegal restraint of trade. The supreme court acknowledged the validity of such
a restriction within a single-owned tract; however, even though the two tracts were represented to the public as being a single shopping center, the court found the separate
ownership element to be fatal. See also Kroger Co. v. J.Weingarten, Inc., 380 S.W.2d
145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the Schnitzer rule was applied despite the fact that the various owners were related corporations and trusts.
255. Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 429 F.2d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Savon Gas Stations Number Six,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962); Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre
Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942); Plum Tree, Inc. v. N.K. Winston Corp., 351 F.
Supp. 80, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
316 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Minn. 1970); cf. Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp.
1083, 1088-89 (M.D. Fla. 1973).

256. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., FTC Dkt. 8885, Consent Order announced November 29,
1973, 39 Fed. Reg. 7164 (1974), Final Order, January 30, 1974.
257. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, FTC Dkt. 8886, Consent Order announced March 5, 1974.

